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Today, there are nine provincially legislated check-off programs in Saskatchewan.  
Check-off and research investment rates among these programs are typically low.  Most check-
off rates are below 0.5 per cent of the value of the underlying commodity and agency research 
expenditures as a percentage of the value of the underlying commodity are, in most cases, less 
than 0.1 per cent.  Persistently low levels of investment combined with evidence from empirical 
studies suggest farmers chronically underinvest in crop research from a profit maximizing 
perspective. 
The refundable nature of Saskatchewan crop research check-offs may be one reason why 
farmers’ collective level of research investment has not increased in a material way.  Of the nine 
provincially legislated crop check-off agencies, eight were established and continue to operate as 
Commissions which administer mandatory yet refundable check-offs.  With refundable check-
offs, producers may request and receive a full refund of their check-off contribution.  It can be 
hypothesized that Commissions may set check-off rates below the optimal, farmer-profit-
maximizing level to avoid excessive refund requests. 
Anecdotal evidence from the Saskatchewan Pulse Development Board and Australia’s 
Grains Research Development Corporation suggests that when check-offs are compulsory check-
off rates are higher.  Despite the apparent advantages of switching to compulsory levies, no 
Commission has attempted to switch. 
The findings of this thesis suggest Crop Development Commissions in Saskatchewan 
suffer from institutional lock-in which inhibits their ability to switch to non-refundable check-
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offs.  Large set-up cost associated with establishing a Commission, coordination effects that 
occur both within a Commission and between Commissions, and the adaptive expectations of 
farmers and those directly involved with crop development check-offs have made the costs of 
switching from a Commission to a board prohibitively high.  As a result, Commissions are 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction and Problem Statement 
Widespread and persistent high rates of return to agricultural research suggest a pattern of 
chronic underinvestment.  A large body of empirical evidence which includes numerous studies 
on many types of agricultural research, on many different crops, in many different jurisdictions, 
and over many different time periods reveals rates of return on research investments that far 
exceed typical market rates of return (Alston et al. 1998; Alston et al. 2000; Alston et al. 2010).  
For example, Alston et al. (1998) conducted a meta-analysis of 294 studies that examined the 
returns to agricultural research and found an average rate of return of 58.6 per cent per year.  
These results indicate that additional investment in agricultural research would benefit society.  
As benefits accrue, additional investment would drive the rate of return down toward market 
rates of return that reflect the social cost of capital. 
The apparent lack of private investment in agricultural research can be attributed to 
incomplete property rights and an inability to capture full value from innovation (Alston and 
Pardey 1999).  Often, new knowledge can be easily copied without full remuneration of those 
who created it.  In crop breeding for example, farmers can often multiply and retain seed for 
years without payment to the crop breeder.  Some agronomic knowledge can be copied by 
literally looking over the fence. 
Traditionally, many governments addressed the lack of private incentives by investing 
directly in agricultural research (Malla 2000).  In Canada, the 1885 Experimental Farm Act, 
which helped establish agricultural research stations across the country, recognized that public 
agricultural research was essential for agricultural development.  Despite over a century of 
success, the level of public investment in production-related agricultural research has declined.  
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This trend will likely continue as demands for government funding in other areas of the economy 
increase and rural populations decrease. 
In Canada, “check-offs” or “levies” have become a common source of crop research 
funding.  The term check-off, “comes from the concept of checking off the appropriate box on a 
form, like a tax return, to authorize a contribution for a specific purpose” (Williams and Capps 
2006, p. 53).  In a typical check-off program, check-offs are deducted from producers’ receipts at 
the first point of sale, forwarded to the appropriate agency, and then allocated to various 
activities that benefit the agency’s members, such as research and development. 
Over the past 28 years, nine producer-controlled crop check-off agencies have been 
established under provincial legislation in Saskatchewan.  The Saskatchewan Pulse Development 
Board was established in 1984, followed by the Saskatchewan Canola Development Commission 
in 1990, the Saskatchewan Flax Development Commission in 1996, the Saskatchewan Alfalfa 
Seed Producers Development Commission in 1997, the Saskatchewan Mustard Development 
Commission in 2003, and the Saskatchewan Forage Seed Producers Development Commission 
in 2005.  The Canaryseed Development Commission of Saskatchewan, Saskatchewan Oat 
Development Commission, and Saskatchewan Winter Cereal Development Commission were 
each established in 2006.  In addition, the Western Grains Research Foundation, which operates 
under federal legislation, began collecting check-offs on wheat and barley produced in the prairie 
provinces in 1993.  As a result of these initiatives, all of the major grain crops and many minor 
crops grown in Saskatchewan have producer-controlled research funding. 
Despite the broad adoption of check-offs, producer agencies have failed to adequately 
address the problem of producer underinvestment.  This is evident both in the high rate of return 
on investment and low absolute levels of investment.  Studies such as Gray and Scott (2003), 
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Scott et al. (2005), and Gray et al. (2008) reported producer benefit-cost ratios ranging from 
4.4:1 to 20.2:1 from check-off based investments in crop research.  Benefit-cost ratios exceeding 
1 suggest collective producer underinvestment from a profit-maximizing perspective since 
additional investment would generate greater benefits than what can be captured on investments 
elsewhere. 
Check-off agencies’ low research investment levels are also consistent with a pattern of 
underinvestment.  According to the Canadian Seed Trade Association, check-off based plant 
research and development expenditure represented approximately four per cent of total plant 
research and development expenditure in Canada in 2007 (Canadian Seed Trade Association 
2008).  On the farm, check-off expenses pale in comparison to other farm input expenses.  In 
2005, the average Saskatchewan farm spent approximately $30,000 on fertilizer and pesticide 
inputs (Statistics Canada 2006).  Between 2000 and 2004, the average alfalfa seed, pulse, canola, 
and flax producer contributed roughly $177, $88, $12, and $11 per year to their respective check-
off programs (Campbell et al. 2007). 
Saskatchewan crop check-off rates typically range between 0.15 and 1.0 per cent of the 
value of the underlying commodity; however, most are set at less than 0.5 per cent.  Since levies 
are agencies’ primary source of revenue, low funding levels translate into low levels of research 
investment (see Table 1-1).  For comparison, the average OECD research intensity for all 





                                                 
1 The average OECD research intensity for all industries in 2008 represents total domestic research and development  
expenditure as a percentage of total gross domestic product for the year. 
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Table 1-1: Selected Data for Crop Check-offs in Saskatchewan 




Refundable Status Check-off Revenue 
3-year average 
Pulse 1.00 0.44 Non-refundable 9,474,821 
Canola 0.21 0.07 Refundable 2,965,617 
Flax 0.32 0.03 Refundable 568,853 
Alfalfa Seed 0.78 0.37c Refundable 124,809 
Mustard 0.50 0.06 Refundable 329,059 
Forage Seed 0.75 0.09c Refundable 48,688 
Canaryseed 0.41 0.12 Refundable 264,895 
Oat 0.36 0.05 Refundable 673,099 
Winter Cereals 0.32 0.01 Refundable 191,753 
Wheat 0.15 0.08 Refundable 5,536,111d 
Barley 0.29 0.17 Refundable 906,195d 
a Check-off as a percentage of the value of the underlying commodity. 
b R&D investment as a percentage of the value of the underlying commodity. 
c Figure calculated based on seed sales only.  If the value of forage production were included, the 
intensity would be much lower. 
d Figure represents revenue collected on production in the Canadian Wheat Board’s (CWB) 
catchment area, which includes Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, and part of British Columbia. 
Source: Author’s calculations.  See Appendix A. 
 
 
The body of evidence indicating high rates of return combined with generally low levels 
of research expenditure begs the question, why do producer-controlled crop check-off agencies 
spend so little on research?  There is likely no single answer to this question; however, there are 
a number of hypotheses, briefly described below and discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3, on 
why producer underinvestment persists. 
First, information is an important factor in investment decisions (Stigler 1961).  Crop 
research benefits are often attributed to factors such as changes in farming practices and weather 
patterns.  In the absence of economic studies and extensive communications, producer 
organizations and the producers they represent may underestimate research benefits and thus be 
unwilling to support additional investment. 
Second, agricultural co-operatives, like producer-controlled research check-off agencies, 
may suffer from the “horizon problem” (Cook 1995).  The horizon problem occurs when 
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members’ time horizons for residual claims on a productive asset are shorter than the productive 
life of the asset, creating a disincentive for members to invest in growth opportunities (Cook 
1995).  Crop research benefits are often realized decades after the initial costs are incurred and, 
according to Statistics Canada’s 2006 Census of Agriculture, the median age of farm operators in 
Saskatchewan was 53 years.  Given the lengthy time lag between research cost and benefits, 
producers nearing retirement may be unwilling to invest more in research. 
Third, producers are heterogeneous in many respects such as farm size, commodities 
produced, and soil and climate conditions, which could affect their ability to benefit from crop 
research and their attitudes toward research funding. 
Fourth, a fear that additional farmer investment would result in reduced public 
investment in research may contribute to low levels of investment.  This attitude may stem from 
the fact that reductions in public support for plant breeding were catalysts for the establishment 
of some producer check-offs in the first place.  Each of these factors may contribute to a lack of 
producer support for more check-off based investment in research. 
A fifth issue that may reduce the level of research check-offs is known in economic 
literature as the “free-rider problem.”  As show in Table 1-1 above, eight of the nine check-off 
programs in Saskatchewan administer refundable check-offs.  This means that producers who 
market these commodities can request and receive a full refund of their check-off contributions.  
While some would argue this makes agencies more accountable, it also allows any producer to 
“free-ride” on other producers’ research contributions.  Thus, farmers can forego the cost of the 
check-off yet still be entitled to the benefits of research.  Development commissions may set low 
check-off rates to avoid excessive free-riding by farmers (Campbell et al. 2007). 
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In contrast to the development commissions, the Saskatchewan Pulse Development 
Board, which is funded by a non-refundable check-off, has seen significant growth in both 
funding levels and research expenditures.  Between 2002 and 2004, the pulse check-off rate was 
doubled from 0.5 to 1 per cent of industry sales.  The new rate is significantly higher than the 
rates set by commissions for other grain crops with refundable check-offs.  The Saskatchewan 
Pulse Development Board also has the highest research intensity at 0.44 per cent and allocates 
more dollars to research than any commission.  The only development agency that administers a 
non-refundable check-off has also been the most successful in funding research. 
The experience in Australia is consistent with the idea that research agencies will choose 
higher levy rates when their levies are compulsory.  The Australian Grain Research and 
Development Corporation administers compulsory crop levies on 25 different commodities.  
This producer/industry-controlled organization maintains a one per cent check-off rate on 
various crops that include cereals, canola, canaryseed and oats among others, which is 
significantly higher than their refundable Canadian counterparts. 
A Saskatchewan development commission wishing to increase its levy rate may attempt 
to do so, as the Canola Commission did, by remaining as a commission.  However, under this 
option, the commission would be faced with the risk of increased refund requests from farmers.  
To mitigate this risk, one would expect that the commission would first inform their farmer 
members, through websites, newsletters and meetings, etc., of the rationale for the rate increase.  
Presumably, the commission would argue the benefits to farmers from increased investments in 
research resulting from the increased levy would far outweigh their increased contributions.  
How effective this educational campaign would be is of course unknown because the incentive to 
request a refund would increase with the levy rate. 
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A second option would be to make the check-off non-refundable by converting from a 
commission to a board.  This option may prove costly, since it would likely involve an extensive 
consultation process with producers, regulators, and politicians.  However, because this option 
mitigates the free-rider problem, it has a potentially higher payoff than the first option. 
It should be noted that while switching to a non-refundable check-off would reduce the 
potential for farmer free-riding, it may not fully eliminate it.  Under a non-refundable check-off 
regime, free-riding could still occur as farmers who oppose the compulsory nature of the check-
off may either implicitly or explicitly apply pressure for the check-off to be set at a sub-optimal 
level (Campbell et al. 2007).  Whether or not an agency’s ability to fund research is greater under 
a non-refundable check-off then it is under a refundable check-off is not necessarily clear; 
however, as discussed above, anecdotal evidence from the Saskatchewan Pulse Growers as well 
as the Australian experience suggest non-refundable check-off agencies are able to access more 
research funding from producers. 
Interestingly, despite the apparent advantages of switching to a board, no crop 
development commission in Saskatchewan has done so and there is seemingly little interest in 
the idea.2
                                                 
2 Notably in 2009, a wheat check-off in Ontario converted from a refundable to a non-refundable while an Alberta 
beef industry check-off converted from a non-refundable to a refundable. 
  There are a number of possible reasons why commissions have not switched to 
boards, which are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3.  One possible reason why switching 
has not occurred can be found in the literature on institutional change.  North (1990) argues that 
institutions – the rules that govern human interaction – are self-reinforcing by nature, which 
makes them prone to a phenomenon called “institutional lock-in.”  North’s theory suggests that 
part of the reason commissions continue to administer refundable check-offs is because they, and 
others like them, have done so in the past.  Do commissions suffer from institutional lock-in? 
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1.2 Purpose and Objectives 
Given the economic benefits of additional check-off funding and the apparent ability of 
crop development boards to mitigate the free-rider problem and fund research at higher levels, 
the purpose of this thesis was to examine the factors that have prevented existing producer-
controlled crop development commissions from transforming to boards.  The specific objective 
of this thesis was to examine the hypothesis that commissions suffer from institutional lock-in 
that inhibits transformation from commission to boards.  While not providing a definitive answer 
to the larger issue of producer underinvestment in agricultural research, this research can provide 
knowledge regarding why a potentially important institution that could be used to address the 
free-rider problem is not being pursued by the industry. 
The empirical aspect of the study was confined to crop research check-offs in the 
province of Saskatchewan.  The province, which has nearly 50 per cent of the cropland in 
Canada, has many crop research organizations that operate within the same legislative 
framework. 
1.3 Methodology 
Since the goal of this thesis was to explore the institutional structure of producer-
controlled crop research check-offs in Saskatchewan, the first step was to document the history 
of farmer-funded crop research in the province and identify the key differences between 
commissions and boards with respect to their research funding levels and expenditure patterns.  
This involved an examination of the relevant legislation and the agencies’ annual reports. 
The second step was to develop a theoretical framework to examine and analyze the 
incentives and constraints for a commission to pursue board status.  This involved a thorough 
review of the literature related to institutional change, and the development of several 
propositions that were tested empirically. 
9 
 
The third step was to conduct interviews with the leadership of check-off organizations to 
document the challenges, as perceived by check-off organizations, related to transforming from 
commission to board. 
The final step was to conduct a qualitative analysis of the data – specifically, to test the 
propositions related to institutional change and improve our general understanding of whether 
development commissions are subject to institutional lock-in.  Since check-offs have become 
important institutions for funding and directing certain types of agricultural research in Canada, 
the examination of institutional lock-in conducted in this study has important implications for 
agricultural policy.  This analysis relates to the key issue of underinvestment in agricultural 
research. 
1.4 Organization of the Study 
This thesis contains six chapters.  Chapter 2 provides an overview of check-off legislation 
in Saskatchewan and examines each check-off agency’s financial performance.  Chapter 3 
includes a survey of the literature on the returns to agricultural research, discusses the economic 
rationale for the use of producer-controlled research check-offs as a means to fund and direct 
certain types of agricultural research, and examines the nature and potential causes of producer 
underinvestment in crop research.  Chapter 4 presents a theoretical framework for examining 
institutional lock-in in the context of producer-controlled check-offs.  The chapter reviews lock-
in literature and presents four research propositions.  Chapter 5 contains the analysis of the data 
collected to test each of the research propositions.  A summary of the study’s findings and policy 
implications, as well as a discussion regarding the limitations of the study and recommendations 
for further research, are contained in Chapter 6.
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CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND 
2.1 Introduction 
Crop research check-offs in Saskatchewan are administered by provincially legislated 
crop development agencies.  Nine agencies have been established in Saskatchewan since the 
early 1980s.  Of the nine, eight were established and continue to operate as commissions.  Only 
one, the Saskatchewan Pulse Development Board, was established and continues to operate as a 
board.  The Saskatchewan Pulse Development Board was the first agency to be established. 
Chapter 2 examines the historical context and legal framework in which crop 
development agencies in Saskatchewan operate.  It also examines the funding and expenditure 
patterns of each development agency. 
2.2 Crop Research Check-offs in Saskatchewan 
In Saskatchewan, producer-controlled crop research check-off programs are administered 
and operate under the provincial Agri-Food Act, 2004.  The purpose of a development agency is 
to “promote and develop the production, marketing or, production and marketing of a defined 
agricultural product” (Government of Saskatchewan website a).  Development agencies have the 
power to collect a “levy that will be used for research and development of the industry” 
(Government of Saskatchewan website a). 
The Agri-Food Act, 2004, allows for the establishment of two types of development 
agencies – development commissions and development boards.3
                                                 
3 Marketing boards can be established under the same Act for purposes of orderly marketing. 
  The main difference between a 
commission and a board is the way in which they are funded.  A development commission is 
funded by a mandatory, refundable check-off, while a development board is funded by a 
mandatory, non-refundable check-off.  Both types of check-offs are considered “mandatory” 
since they are automatically deducted at the first point of sale.  However, with refundable check-
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offs, farmers have the right to request and receive a refund of their check-off contribution 
whereas with non-refundable check-offs, as the term suggests, they do not. 
Development agencies (both commissions and boards) operate within their own set of 
regulations and orders.  Agency regulations “provide the structure and basis by which the 
agencies must operate” and define such things as the purpose of the plan, the powers of the 
agency, the fiscal year, the rules regarding producer registration, and the rules regarding levy 
refunds (Government of Saskatchewan website a).  Agency orders are more specific as they 
stipulate the levy rate, requirements for refunds requests, and buyer registration among other 
things. 
The Agri-Food Council (Council) is the regulatory body responsible for administering the 
Agri-Food Act, 2004.  The Council consists of a board of directors who are appointed by the 
provincial government.  The Council provides advice to the Agriculture Minister; helps groups 
establish levies; monitors the agencies’ finances; supervises votes on establishing agencies; and 
ensures accountability, compliance, and dispute resolution (Government of Saskatchewan 
website a). 
Nine crop development agencies have been established under provincial legislation in 
Saskatchewan since 1984.  They are, in chronological order, the Saskatchewan Pulse 
Development Board, the Saskatchewan Canola Development Commission, the Saskatchewan 
Flax Development Commission, the Saskatchewan Alfalfa Seed Producers Development 
Commission, the Saskatchewan Mustard Development Commission, the Forage Seed 
Development Commission, the Canaryseed Development Commission of Saskatchewan, the 




2.2.1 Saskatchewan Pulse Development Board 
The Saskatchewan Pulse Development Board (SPDB) was established on July 13, 1984.  
It is funded by a mandatory non-refundable check-off on the sale of pulses.  Originally, the pulse 
check-off was set at 0.5 per cent of the gross value of the sale; however, between 2002 and 2004, 
the rate was increased to 1 per cent.  There are approximately 18,000 producers registered with 
the SPDB.  The agency’s mission is, “To provide leadership for an innovative, profitable and 
sustainable Saskatchewan pulse industry through research, market development and 
communication in collaboration with stakeholders” (Saskatchewan Pulse Growers website).  The 
SPDB’s vision statement is, “Saskatchewan will be an industry leader in the production, 
processing, and marketing of high quality and high value pulse products for a viable and 
profitable Canadian pulse industry” (Saskatchewan Pulse Growers website). 
The SPDB’s average annual check-off and total revenues from fiscal 2007 to fiscal 2009 
were $9.475 million and $10.29 million respectively.  Research expenditure over the period 
averaged $4.19 million per year, 41 per cent of average total revenue.  Administration, Pulse 
Canada, communication, variety commercialization, policy, and domestic market development 
expenditures combined represented 27 per cent of average total revenue.4
                                                 
4 Pulse Canada is a national pulse industry association that represents the interests of pulse producers, processors, 
and traders.  Market access, market growth and innovation, transportation, environment, and industry initiatives are 
among the issues Pulse Canada focuses on (Pulse Canada website). 
  Excess revenue over 




Figure 2-1. Shares of SPDB’s Total Revenue from September 1, 2006 to August 31, 2009 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SPDB annual reports 
 
 
2.2.2 Saskatchewan Canola Development Commission  
The Saskatchewan Canola Development Commission (SCDC) was established on 
February 6, 1991.  It is funded by a mandatory refundable check-off on canola sales.  Initially, 
the canola check-off was set at $0.50 per tonne but was increased to $0.75 per tonne between 
2004 and 2005.  The SCDC has a membership of approximately 26,000 producers.  The agency’s 
mission is, “To enhance canola producers’ competitiveness and profitability through a producer 
led and controlled fund to support research, market development and extension activities” 
(SaskCanola website).  Their vision statement is, “Shaping canola’s future for producer 
profitability” (SaskCanola website). 
The SCDC’s average annual check-off and total revenues from fiscal 2007 to 2009 were 
$3.196 million and $3.562 million respectively.  Research expenditures over the period averaged 
$941 thousand per year, 26 per cent of average total revenue.  Market development, 
administration, communication and other expenditures combined represented 63 per cent of 
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average total revenue.  Approximately 6 per cent of average total revenue was refunded back to 
producers and excess revenue over expenses represented 5 per cent for the period. 
 
Figure 2-2. Shares of SCDC’s Total Revenue from August 1, 2006 to July 31, 2007 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SCDC annual reports 
 
 
2.2.3 Saskatchewan Flax Development Commission 
The Saskatchewan Flax Development Commission (SFDC) was established on April 16, 
1996.  The agency is funded by a mandatory refundable check-off equal to $1.18 per tonne on 
the sale of grain flax.  Flax straw sales are subject to a $0.50 per tonne check-off; however, the 
SFDC has not received any flax straw check-off revenue to date (Ulrich 2010).  The SFDC has 
approximately 15,000 farmer members.  The agency’s mission is, “To lead, promote and 
enhance the production, value-added processing and utilization of Saskatchewan flax” (SaskFlax 
website). 
The SFDC’s average annual check-off and total revenues from fiscal 2007 to 2009 were 
$596 thousand and $786 thousand respectively.  Average annual research expenditures were $57 
thousand, 7 per cent of average total revenue for the period.  Market facilitation, administration 
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and communication together represented 76 per cent of average total revenue over the period.  
Refunds totaled 4 per cent while excess revenue over expenditures totaled 13 per cent of average 
total revenue for the period. 
 
Figure 2-3. Shares of SFDC’s Total Revenue from August 1, 2006 to July 31, 2009 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SFDC annual reports 
 
 
2.2.4 Saskatchewan Alfalfa Seed Producers Development Commission 
The Saskatchewan Alfalfa Seed Producers Development Commission (SASPDC) was 
established on July 24, 1997, and, since August 1 of that year, has collected $0.0075 per pound 
of alfalfa seed sales.5
The SASPDC’s average annual check-off and total revenues from fiscal 2007 to 2009 
were $135 thousand and $165 thousand respectively.  The SASPDC’s annual research 
expenditures averaged approximately $58 thousand, 35 per cent of average total revenue for the 
  Today there are approximately 300 producers registered with the Alfalfa 
Seed Commission. 
                                                 
5 Unlike most of the other check-off programs, the alfalfa seed check-off is collected on seed sales only.  However, 
sales of alfalfa “breeder” seed are excluded. 
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three fiscal years ending in 2009.  Administration, communication, and other expenditures 
together represented 39 per cent of average total revenue for the period.  Refunds represented 7 
per cent and excess revenue over expenses represented 19 per cent of average total revenue for 
the period. 
 
Figure 2-4. Shares of SASPDC’s Total Revenue from August 1, 2006 to July 31, 2009 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SASPDC annual reports 
 
 
2.2.5 Saskatchewan Mustard Development Commission 
The Saskatchewan Mustard Development Commission (SMDC) was established in 
October 2003.  Since January 1, 2004, the SMDC has collected a refundable check-off set at 0.5 
per cent of the value of the sale of mustard.  There are approximately 2,300 producers registered 
with the SMDC.  The agency’s mission statement is, “Growing the mustard industry for the 
benefit of growers through research, communication and market development programs” and 
their vision statement is, “Investing in the future for mustard grower profitability.” 
(Saskatchewan Mustard Development Commission website) 
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The SMDC’s average annual check-off and total revenues from fiscal 2007 to 2009 were 
$348 thousand and $887 thousand respectively.6
 
  The SMDC’s annual research expenditures 
averaged roughly $42 thousand, 5 per cent of average total revenue for the period.  Expenditure 
on the Mustard 21 project represented roughly 52 per cent of the SMDC’s average total revenue 
for the period.  Administration, communication, and other expenses together represented 20 per 
cent of average total revenue.  Refunds represented 2 per cent of average total revenue while 
excess revenue over expenses represented 21 per cent. 
Figure 2-5. Shares of SMDC’s Total Revenue from August 1, 2006 to July 31, 2009 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SMDC annual reports 
 
 
2.2.6 Saskatchewan Forage Seed Development Commission 
The Saskatchewan Forage Seed Development Commission (SFSDC) was established on 
June 29, 2005.  The agency collects a mandatory refundable check-off set at 0.75 per cent of the 
gross value of the sale of forage seed (excluding alfalfa seed).7
                                                 
6 Most of the revenue over and above the check-off revenue came from Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada. 
  Information on the size of the 
7 Like with the alfalfa seed check-off, “breeder” forage seed sales are exempt from the program. 
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SFSDC’s membership was not available; however, the number of producers registered with the 
Commission is expected to be in the low hundreds – similar to that of the SASPDC. 
The SFSDC’s annual check-off and total revenues from fiscal 2007 to 2009 both 
averaged $51 thousand.  Annual research expenditure averaged $6 thousand over the period, 11 
per cent of total revenue.  Administration and communication expenses combined represented 16 
per cent of total revenue.  Refunds totaled 6 per cent and excess revenue over expenses totaled 
68 per cent of total revenue over the three years of operation. 
 
Figure 2-6. Shares of SFSDC’s Total Revenue from June 30, 2006 to July 1, 2009 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SFSDC Annual Reports 
 
 
2.2.7 Canaryseed Development Commission of Saskatchewan 
The Canaryseed Development Commission of Saskatchewan (CDCS) was established on 
February 23, 2006, and began collecting levies on May 1 of that year.  Since then, the CDCS has 
collected a mandatory refundable check-off set at $1.75 per tonne on canaryseed sales.  Today, 
there are approximately 5,000 producers registered with the Canaryseed Commission.  
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The CDCS’s average annual check-off and total revenues from fiscal 2007 to 2009 were 
$278 thousand and $370 thousand respectively.8
 
  Average annual research expenditure for the 
period was $76 thousand, 20 per cent of average total revenue.  Expenditures on an Advancing 
Canadian Agriculture and Agri-Food (ACAAF) project represented 18 per cent of average total 
revenue.  Administration and communication expenses together represented 18 per cent of 
average total revenue while refunds and excess revenue over expenses represented 4 per cent and 
40 per cent of average total revenue respectively over the three fiscal years of operation. 
Figure 2-7. Shares of CDCS’s Total Revenue from August 1, 2006 to July 31, 2009 
Source: Author’s calculations based on CDCS Annual Reports 
 
 
2.2.8 Saskatchewan Oat Development Commission 
The Saskatchewan Oat Development Commission (SODC) was established on April 12, 
2006.  Since then, the SODC has collected a mandatory refundable check-off set at $0.50 per 
                                                 




tonne on oat sales.  There are approximately 9,000 producers registered with the Oat 
Commission.  
The SODC’s average annual check-off and total revenues from fiscal 2007 to 2009 were 
$705 thousand and $740 thousand respectively.  The SODC’s average research expenditure for 
the period was $86 thousand, 12 per cent of the SODC’s average total revenue.  Administration, 
communication, and policy development expenditures together represented 14 per cent of 
average total revenue for the period.  Refunds and excess revenue over expenses represented 4 
per cent and 70 per cent of average total revenue respectively for the three fiscal years. 
 
Figure 2-8. Shares of SODC’s Total Revenue from August 1, 2006 to July 31, 2009 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SMDC Annual Reports 
 
 
2.2.9 Saskatchewan Winter Cereals Development Commission 
The SWCDC was established on August 16, 2006.  Since then, the SWDC has collected a 
mandatory refundable check-off of $0.50 per tonne on winter wheat, fall rye, and winter triticale 
sales.  Today, there are approximately 2,800 producers registered with the agency.  
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The SWCDC’s average annual check-off and total revenues from fiscal 2007 to 2009 
were $153 thousand and $155 thousand respectively.  Research expenditures averaged $7 
thousand per year for the period, 5 per cent of average total revenue.9
 
  Administration, 
communication, and other expenses together represented 26 per cent of average total revenue for 
the period.  Refunds and excess revenue over expenses represented 1 per cent and 68 per cent of 
average total revenue over the period respectively. 
Figure 2-9. Shares of SWCDC’s Total Revenue from August 1, 2007 to July 31, 2009 




Of the nine crop development agencies operating in Saskatchewan, only the SPDB is 
funded by a non-refundable crop research check-off.  The rest are development commissions that 
charge refundable check-offs.  Agency membership ranges from the low hundreds, as is the case 
with the SFSDC and the SASPDC, to 26,000, as is the case with SCDC.  Check-off revenue and 
                                                 
9 The SWCDC reported a $21 thousand research expense in fiscal 2009.  Prior to fiscal 2009 the agency had not 
reported any research expenditure. 
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research expenditure range from the tens of thousands as is the case for the forage seed and 
alfalfa seed check-off programs to multi-millions as is the case for the pulse and canola check-
off programs. 















SPDB 1984 18,000 Non-refundable 1% GVSb 9,475 4,190 
SCDC 1991 26,000 Refundable $0.75/tonne 3,196 941 
SFDC 1996 15,000 Refundable $1.18/tonnec 596 57 
SASPDC 1997 300 Refundable $0.0075/pound 135 58 
SMDC 2003 2,300 Refundable 0.5% GVSb 348 42 
SFSDC 2005 NAa Refundable 0.75% GVSb 51 6 
CDCS 2006 5,000 Refundable $1.75/tonne 278 76 
SODC 2006 9,000 Refundable $0.50/tonne 705 86 
SWCDC 2006 2,800 Refundable $0.50/tonne 153 7 
a Data not available 
b Gross Value of the Sale 
c SFDC’s $1.18 per tonne check-off applies only to the sale of grain flax.  Flax straw sales are 
subject to a $0.50 per tonne check-off; however, the SFDC has not received any flax straw 
check-off revenue to date (Ulrich 2010). 
Source: Agencies’ Annual Reports.  See Appendix A. 
 
 
Total refunds as a percentage of total check-off revenue typically range from 5 to 7 per 
cent.  For some commissions, such as the Flax and Canaryseed Commissions, refund rates have 
remained relatively stable.  For others, the refund rates have increased over time.  For example, 
refund rates for the Canola Commission were relatively low and stable from 2000 to 2003; but 
from 2003 to 2008 the refund rate increased each year.  Since 2007, the refund rates for canola 
have exceeded 7 per cent.  The increase in the canola check-off from $0.50 per tonne to $0.75 




Table 2-2. Refund Ratesa 
Commodity Fiscal Year Ending 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Canola 3.1 4.5 4.3 4.7 5.8 6.2 6.6 7.1 7.4 7.2 
Flax 4.8 4.4 5.3 4.6 5.5 6.3 4.3 4.1 5.7 4.0 
Alfalfa Seed 9.4 5.7 5.9 9.5 5.1 7.4 7.7 7.8 13.4 2.1 
Mustard     2.3 3.0 2.2 4.8 5.9 5.1 
Forage Seed       4.9 10.7 2.2 2.2 
Canaryseed       4.9 4.7 4.8 5.3 
Oat         3.7 3.9 6.1 
Winter Cereals        0.3 2.2 1.1 
a Dollars refunded as a percentage of gross check-off revenue.  






CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1 Introduction 
Studies that examine the economic impact of agricultural research suggest chronic 
underinvestment from society’s perspective.  The underinvestment problem is caused in part by 
the public-good nature of agricultural research.  One way governments attempt to induce 
investment in agricultural research is by enacting regulations that facilitate collective action by 
producers: legislation that enables producer-controlled check-off programs is one example.  
Despite the broad adoption of check-offs, producer underinvestment still seems to be an issue.  
The low levels of investment among Saskatchewan check-off programs shown in Chapters 1 and 
2, combined with evidence from empirical studies discussed below, support this argument.  As 
mentioned in Chapter 1, there are many possible reasons why producers spend too little on 
research from a profit-maximizing perspective.  One potentially important contributing factor is 
the refundable nature of check-off programs. 
Chapter 3 is divided into three sections.  The first section, “Underinvestment in 
Agricultural Research,” summarizes the literature on the returns to agricultural research and 
discusses the theoretical arguments regarding why underinvestment exists.  The second section, 
“The Economics of Research Check-offs,” reviews theoretical literature that examines equity, 
incentives, efficiency, and some institutional advantages of research check-offs.  The third 
section, “Putting the Research Question into Context,” discusses some of the possible reasons 
why low funding levels persist among many crop development agencies and why commissions 
have failed to pursue board status. 
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3.2 Underinvestment in Agricultural Research 
3.2.1 Evidence of Underinvestment 
An overwhelming number of studies have examined the economic impacts of agricultural 
research.  These studies often show social rates of return in excess of 20 per cent per year (see 
Table 3-1).  Persistent high rates of return over and above the standard rate of return suggest 
underinvestment (Alston and Pardey 1999).10
Table 3-1. Selected Returns to Agricultural Research Studies 
 
Study Commodity Country Internal Rate of Return 
percentage 
Griliches (1958) Corn USA 35 - 40 
Peterson (1967) Poultry USA 20 - 30 
Schmitz and Seckler (1970) Tomato USA ≥ 50 
Akino and Hayami (1975) Rice Japan 73 - 75 
Nagy and Furtan (1978) Rapeseed Canada 101 
Scobie and Posada (1978) Rice Columbia 79 - 96 
Zentner (1982) Wheat Canada 34 - 59 
Ulrich et al. (1984) Canola Canada 51 
Zentner and Peterson (1984) Wheat Canada 30 - 39 
Ulrich and Furtan (1985) Canola Canada 50 
Widmer et al. (1988) Beef Cattle Canada 63 
Morris et al. (1994) Wheat Nepal 49 - 84 
Klein et al. (1996) Wheat Canada 27 - 39 
Gray and Malla (2000) Wheat Canada 40 
Source: As noted in table. 
 
 
One of the most influential studies on the return to agricultural research is Alston et al. 
(1998).  The authors conducted a meta-analysis of 294 studies containing 1,858 estimates of the 
returns on agricultural R&D.  The study found, 
In the 95 percent dataset, the overall average rate of return across all 1,144 
observations was 58.6 percent per annum, with a standard deviation of 51.7 (the 
estimated annual rates of return averaged 64.2 percent for research only, 46.3 
percent for research and extension combined, and 75.6 percent for extension 
only).  In the second dataset the overall average rate of return across all 1,181 
                                                 
10 According to Alston and Pardey (1999) the real rate at which governments borrow money – usually 3 to 5 per cent 
per year – is the appropriate comparison for rates of return to agricultural research. 
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observations was 63.4 percent per annum with a standard deviation of 66.7 (the 
rate of return averaged 70.5 percent for research only, 49.7 percent for research 
and extension, and 75.6 percent for extension only). (Alston et al. 1998, p. 27) 
Studies that examine producer returns from crop research also show high rates of return.  
For example, Gray and Scott (2003) examined the economic impacts of the Saskatchewan Pulse 
Development Board’s research expenditures for two periods.  For the period 1984 to 2008, the 
study estimated a benefit-cost ratio of 6.1:1 – meaning pulse producers earned over six dollars 
for every dollar invested in pulse research through the Saskatchewan Pulse Development Board.  
For the period 1984 to 2020, the study estimated producers benefited by a factor of 15.6.  Scott et 
al. (2005) estimated the economic returns to producers from the Western Grains Research 
Foundation’s expenditures on wheat and barley research for the period 1998-2020.  The study 
found that wheat and barley producers benefit by factors of 4.4 and 12.4 respectively.  Gray et al. 
(2008) revisited the returns to pulse producers’ research question and estimated a benefit-cost 
ratio of 15.8:1 for the period 1984 to 2012, and 20.2:1 for the period 1984 to 2024 (see Table 3-
2). 
Table 3-2: Returns to Producer Investment in Crop Research 
Study Commodity Period Benefit-Cost Ratio 
Gray and Scott (2003) Pulse 1984-2008 6.1 : 1 
  1984-2020 15.6 : 1 
Scott et al. (2005) Wheat 1998-2020 4.4 : 1 
 Barley 1998-2020 12.4 : 1 
Gray et al. (2008) Pulse 1984-2012 15.8 : 1 
  1984-2024 20.2 : 1 
Source: As noted in table 
 
 
The results from these studies suggest producers collectively spend too little on research 
from a profit-maximizing perspective.  Benefit-cost ratios exceeding 1 suggest collective 
producer underinvestment from a profit-maximizing perspective since additional investment 
would generate greater benefits than what can be captured on investments elsewhere. 
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3.2.2 Public Good Problem in Agricultural Research 
New knowledge created by agricultural research often exhibits public good 
characteristics.  Public goods are non-excludable – meaning individuals cannot be excluded from 
consuming the good – and non-rival – meaning consumption of the good by one does not 
diminishes its availability to another (Fulton et al. 2007).  Plant breeding research exhibits public 
good characteristics when farmers can sow saved seed without paying the developer of the seed.  
Some types of agronomic research exhibit public good characteristics since farmers can freely 
acquire knowledge by copying their neighbours’ practices.  Once acquired, public good 
knowledge can be used over and over again at zero marginal cost. 
Private firms lack the economic incentive to invest in public good research at the socially 
optimal level.  Figure 3-3 illustrates what happens when production of a public good is left to 
private firms. 
In Figure 3-3, MBS is society’s marginal benefit curve, which represents society’s 
willingness to pay for the good (demand).  MBP represents the private demand for the good, 
which, in this case, is lower than MBS since individuals can enjoy the benefits without having to 
pay for the research.  MC is the private firm’s supply curve. 
Economic theory states that profit-maximizing firms will produce up to the point where 
the private marginal benefits equal the private marginal costs.  This results in an equilibrium 
quantity of QP.  However, the socially optimal level of output is QS.  The resulting gap between 
QP and QS reflects the private firm’s inability to fully appropriate the benefits of their research 
investments.  A strengthening of property rights would shift the MBP curve toward the MBS 




Figure 3-1. Private Expenditure on Public Good Research 
Source: Gray et al. (2001) 
 
 
Alston and Pardey (1999) attribute the market failure in agricultural R&D to the 
divergence between private and social costs and benefits.  The non-excludable nature of many 
types of agricultural research is the primary reason why private and social interests are not 
aligned, and why agricultural research suffers from underinvestment from society’s perspective. 
3.3 The Economics of Research Check-offs 
Governments may address a lack of private investment in agricultural research by 
conducting public good research themselves or by developing policy that encourages additional 
private investment.  Additional private investment can be stimulated by strengthening property 










that facilitate collective action by producers such as commodity check-off programs (Alston and 
Pardey 1999).  Commodity check-offs in particular have a number of features that make them an 
attractive way to finance and govern the provision of certain types of agricultural research from 
society’s perspective. 
First, check-offs are a relatively “fair” way to fund research.  Check-offs, in theory, allow 
for a proportional distribution of research costs and benefits between producers and consumers 
(Alston et al. 2004).  For example, in Figure 3-2, a check-off of t per unit shifts the supply curve 
upward from S0 to S1.  In this case, consumer surplus decreases by P1abP0 and producer surplus 
decreases by P0bcd, thus, both consumers and producers bear the check-off burden.  In this 
particular example, consumers bear two-thirds and producers bear one-third of the check-off 
burden.11
Now suppose the check-off revenue, represented by area P1acd, is used to develop a new 
technology that reduces farmers’ cost of production by k per unit.  This reduction in producers’ 
production cost is represented by the shift from S1 to S2.  Once again both consumers and 
producers benefit from the new technology as consumer surplus increases by area P1aeP2, and 
producer surplus increases by area P2efg.  In this particular case, consumers capture two-thirds of 
the total research benefit while producers receive one-third.  Thus, the distribution of the 
research benefits is proportional to the distribution of the research burden between producers and 
consumers. 
 
                                                 
11 It should be noted that the check-off burden split between producers and consumers depends on the relative 




Figure 3-2. The Distribution of Check-off Burden and Research Benefits 
Source: Adapted from Alston et al. (2004) 
 
 
It is important to note that this theoretical equality of incidence holds even when the 
relative slopes of the demand and the supply curves are changed (Alston et al. 2004).  For 
example, if the demand curve is completely horizontal (i.e., demand is perfectly elastic), and the 
supply curve is not, then producers bear 100 per cent of the research burden and receive 100 per 
cent of the research benefits.  Conversely, if the demand curve is completely vertical (i.e., 
perfectly inelastic demand), and the supply curve is not, then consumers bear 100 per cent of the 
research burden and receive 100 per cent of the research benefits.  Check-offs allow for a 






















regardless of relative demand and supply elasticities.  For this reason check-offs are considered 
to be a relatively fair way to fund research. 
A second feature that makes check-offs an attractive tool for funding certain types of 
research relates to the fact that producer-controlled check-offs programs give farmers a voice in 
the direction of agricultural research.  According to Picciotto (1995), the nature of a good 
determines which sector (private, public, or civil) is able to produce the good in the most socially 
efficient manner.  According to Picciotto (1995), what matters in addition to excludability and 
rivalry, is the degree to which production efficiency relies on local knowledge – a characteristic 
Picciotto termed “voice.”  Since producers are often the users of the knowledge developed from 
research, they are often best suited to make the decisions regarding research production and 
provision.  
Ronald Coase made similar arguments in his 1974 article entitled, “The Lighthouse in 
Economics,” which examined the governance structure of lighthouse services in Britain.  Coase 
(1974) argued that even though lighthouse services generally fit the criteria of a public good, a 
system where the users of lighthouse services fund (through dues) and direct its provision may 
be superior.  Like Picciotto (1995), Coase (1974) explained that users of lighthouse services are 
generally better suited to make decisions regarding the provision of lighthouse services since 
they have specific knowledge of their lighthouse service needs and a vested interest in the benefit 
and cost of its provision. 
Finally, check-offs are a relatively inexpensive source of funding for research from 
society’s perspective (Alston and Pardey 1999).  Fullerton (1991) estimated that raising one 
dollar through general taxation costs society between US$1.07 and US$1.25 (Alston and Pardey 
1999).  This cost reflects the deadweight loss that occurs when markets are taxed.  Since check-
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off rates are typically set far lower than the rates taxpayers are subject to, the deadweight loss to 
society per dollar of research funding raised through check-offs is likely lower than it is with 
general taxation (Alston and Pardey 1999).  In this sense, check-offs are a relatively inexpensive 
source of funds from society’s perspective. 
In summary, check-offs align the interests of producers, consumers, and society as a 
whole.  They give farmers a voice in the agricultural research and development process, which is 
beneficial to society when the efficient production of research requires some degree of local 
knowledge.  Check-offs are an inexpensive way to raise funding for research since the 
deadweight loss to society is low compared to other alternative funding sources such as general 
taxation.  These features make check-offs an attractive way to fund and direct certain types of 
agricultural research from society’s perspective. 
3.4 Putting the Research Question into Context 
The specific issue examined in this thesis is whether commissions suffer from 
institutional lock-in that inhibits their ability to switch to non-refundable check-offs.  The theory 
of institutional lock-in is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4.  The following concepts 
underlie this inquiry.  By switching from refundable to non-refundable levies, crop development 
agencies would eliminate farmers’ ability to request refunds of their check-off contributions.  
This would potentially give commissions more freedom to increase their check-off rate and fund 
research at higher levels.  Despite these apparent advantages, no commission to date has 
attempted to switch.  There are a number of theories regarding why commissions have not 
pursued non-refundable check-offs.  One theory is that commissions are locked in to their current 
practices. 
Before proceeding with the examination of lock-in, it is important to understand three 
things.  First, there are a number of possible reasons why producers spend too little on research.  
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Farmer free-riding is not the only possible explanation; therefore, fixing the free-rider problem 
will not necessarily fix the underinvestment problem.  Second, whether switching to non-
refundable levies would necessarily reduce the overall level of farmer free-riding is debatable.  
Refund requests are only one form of farmer free-riding, and producers could free-ride in other 
ways that could undermine agencies’ ability to increase levy rates (Campbell et al. 2007).  Third, 
institutional lock-in is only one possible explanation for commissions’ apparent bias for the 
status quo.  If the notion that non-refundable check-offs are a more effective tool for generating 
funding for research is accepted, then there may be other reasons why commissions are stuck. 
To put the research question into context, this section examines the possible reasons why 
producers spend too little on research and why producers and the check-off agencies that 
represent them have failed to switch to what seem to be more effective check-off mechanisms.  
This section also re-examines the arguments that serve as the basis for this study, namely: (1) the 
threat of excessive refund requests causes commissions to set sub-optimally low check-off rates 
from a producer profit-maximizing perspective, and (2) switching to non-refundable levies will 
increase agencies’ ability to fund research at higher levels. 
3.4.1 Producer Underinvestment 
The high returns to producers’ investments in crop research discussed above, combined 
with the low absolute levels of investment shown in Chapters 1 and 2, suggest farmers spend too 
little on research from a profit-maximizing perspective.  To put the producer underinvestment 
problem into context, consider this: at check-off and research investment rates of 0.5 per cent 
and 0.1 per cent of the gross value of the commodity respectively (these are typical rates in 
Saskatchewan), a producer selling a commodity worth $300 per tonne would pay $1.50 per tonne 
check-off fee of which $0.30 per tonne would be invested in research on his/her behalf.  Given 
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that studies have concluded that farmers have received between $4.40 and $20.20 per dollar 
invested in crop research, the producer underinvestment problem seems to be severe. 
Perhaps producers’ underinvest in research because they are generally unaware of the 
benefits of research.  Results from a separate experiment conducted by Professor Gray 
(supervisor) and Eric Froystad (researcher) support this hypothesis.12
In the experiment, participants filled out a questionnaire that asked them to indicate their 
preferred check-off rate and check-off type (refundable or non-refundable) for the various crops 
they grow as listed on a multiple-choice menu.  After the participants completed the 
questionnaire, Professor Gray presented information regarding documented rates of return to 
research, alternative research funding systems, and research funding levels in other jurisdictions.  
Once the information session was complete, participants were asked to fill out a second survey 
that was identical to the first to see if their answers changed. 
  The exercise was 
conducted on a small group of producers who belong to marketing club in a farming community 
in southern Saskatchewan.  The group agreed to participate in the exercise and engage in a 
discussion regarding check-offs in return for a market outlook presentation by Professor Gray. 
The results of the exercise showed that, on average, participants’ preferences for higher 
check-off rates and non-refundable check-offs increased after the information session.  These 
results suggest not only that information plays a role in producers’ check-off preferences but that 
producers might support higher check-off rates and non-refundable check-offs if they were better 
informed of the benefits of research and these check-off programs.  Perhaps check-off agencies 
are not doing enough to inform their members of the economic benefits of research.  A summary 
of the exercise and its results can be found in Appendix B and a sample of the questionnaire used 
in the exercise can be found in Appendix C. 
                                                 
12 This experiment received ethics approval from the University of Saskatchewan. 
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In farmers’ defence, there are at least two reasons why they may be generally unaware of 
the benefits of research.  First, crop research benefits are often difficult to observe and attributed 
to other factors such as changes in farming practices and weather patterns.  Second, there have 
only been a few academic studies that specifically examine returns to producers.  Studies such as 
Gray and Scott (2003), Gray et al. (2008), and Scott et al. (2005), examined returns to pulse, 
wheat, and barley research, but similar studies on producer returns to canola or flax research are 
for the most part, absent.  Perhaps the lack of economic studies and extension services has 
caused producer organizations to underestimate research benefits and made them unwilling to 
support additional investment. 
Another potential reason for low investment levels among crop research agencies may be 
inadequate access to research infrastructure.  Perhaps some agencies have limited opportunities 
to invest in research as a result of too few plant breeders, labs, etc.  That being said, it could also 
be argued that a lack of research infrastructure is another reason why research organizations 
would want to find ways to raise additional research funds. 
Additional investment in research may not be warranted if rates of return to other 
activities such as market development, producer advocacy, and producer education exceed that 
of research.  However, while this argument may partially explain why research expenditures 
have remained relatively low it does not explain why check-off rates have remained low.  If 
underinvestment exists for a number of activities, there would be an even greater incentive to 
increase check-off rates. 
High levels of public investment may be “crowding out” producer investment (Malla and 
Gray 2005).  If the government is heavily involved in funding research there may be no 
economic rationale for a producer group to increase their level of investment.  However, if this 
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hypothesis is true, then a low the rate of return on public investment should be evident, which is 
not supported in the findings of numerous rate-of-return studies. 
Farmers may fear that additional producer investment would result in reduced public 
investment in research.  This attitude may stem from the fact that reductions in public support for 
plant breeding were one of the catalysts for the establishment of producer check-offs in the first 
place.13
Producer-controlled crop development agencies may suffer from the “horizon problem” 
(Cook 1995).  The horizon problem, in the context of an agricultural co-operative, occurs when 
the period of time during which the members of the co-operative can make residual claims on a 
productive asset are shorter than the productive life of the asset (Cook 1995).  This misalignment 
of time horizons creates a disincentive for members’ to invest in growth opportunities (Cook 
1995).  Often, crop research benefits are realized decades after the initial costs are incurred.
 
14
In addition to age, producers and the farms they operate are heterogeneous in such 
respects as farm size, commodities produced, and soil and climate conditions.  These differences 
could also affect producers’ ability to benefit from crop research and their attitudes toward 
research funding. 
  
For this reason, some economists have described agricultural research as “slow magic” (Pardey 
and Beintema 2001).  The median age of farm operators in Saskatchewan was 53 years in 2005 
(Statistics Canada 2006).  This means that some producers paying for research may never realize 
the benefits.  Given the time lag between research cost and benefits, producers nearing retirement 
may be unwilling to invest more in research.  From this perspective, it is easy to understand why 
some farmers would not support additional investments in crop research.   
                                                 
13 In Australia the government made commitments to match industry levies to avoid this perception. 
14 Alston et al. (2010) found that agricultural research in the United States has its peak impact twenty-five years after 
the research expenditure was made. 
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Regional spillovers may contribute to underinvestment (Evenson 1989; Harris and Lloyd 
1991).  In some cases, research funded by a producer group in one region could result in 
knowledge that producers in other region can use freely.  These spillovers may reduce the 
incentive to fund these types of research and contribute to producer underinvestment. 
The final argument, and the argument that this study is based on, regarding why 
producers underfund crop research from a profit-maximizing perspective, is that producer 
underinvestment in crop research is at least partly due to the refundable nature of check-offs.  In 
a refundable check-off system, producers are able to free-ride by requesting a refund of their 
check-off contribution.  Free-riding, in the context of crop research, occurs when those who 
benefit from the research do so without paying for it.  Farmers, whether they perceive a value to 
the research or not, have no incentive – in a strict economic sense – to contribute, since any 
farmer can access the research benefits that stem from the check-off without paying the check-
off.  Referring back to Figure 3.2, with a check-off in place, a free-riding producer’s cost 
structure would not increase by t; however, the producers would still enjoy the cost per unit 
reduction of k. 
In theory, producers’ ability to free-ride on other producers’ research contributions in a 
refundable check-off system limits agencies’ ability to increase check-off rates since an increase 
in levy may trigger excessive refund requests (Campbell et al. 2007).  Agencies that administer 
non-refundable check-offs, such as the Saskatchewan Pulse Growers, do not have this constraint 
when making their check-off rate decision.  According to Campbell et al. (2007), “the non-
refundable nature of pulse crop levies helps to explain partially why pulse growers 
systematically contribute higher amounts to R&D than producers in comparable sectors.”  It 
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therefore seems the fact that the only non-refundable crop research check-off is also the leader 
with respect to contribution rates and research-funding levels is not merely a coincidence. 
While not particularly apparent at low check-off rates, the free-rider problem could 
become more significant at higher check-off rates.  Refund rates among refundable agencies are 
generally low, in most cases ranging between 5 and 7 per cent.  This suggests that free riding is 
not a significant issue; however, refund levels are not a perfect proxy for free-riding.  Farmer 
free-riding at very low levy rates is limited by the transactions costs of obtaining a levy refund.  
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the average alfalfa seed, pulse, canola, and flax producer spent 
roughly $177, $88, $12, and $11 per year through their respective check-off programs between 
2000 and 2004 (Campbell et. al 2007).  Given these very low annual costs, producers may find 
that they cannot afford the time necessary to find the information and go through the steps 
required to request a refund, even if they perceived no benefit from the research. 
In summary, producer underinvestment in crop research is a complex issue.  There are 
many possible reasons why, despite evidence of producer underinvestment, producers and the 
check-off agencies that represent them continue to spend too little on research.  Part of the 
answer may lie in the refundable nature of check-offs.  Even though switching to non-refundable 
check-offs is likely not a “silver bullet” solution to the producer underinvestment problem, it 
would potentially mitigate producers’ ability to free-ride, at least theoretically explaining why 
check-off rates among commissions have not increased by any significant measure.  Thus, the 
barriers to switching from development commission to development board may inform the 
question of why producers underinvest and are therefore worth examining.  This final 
consideration motivated the examination of the conversion from commission to a board. 
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3.4.2 Commissions’ Failure to Convert 
If it is accepted that non-refundable check-offs are more effective than refundable check-
offs at generating funding for research, then why have commissions failed to make the switch?  
There are some very interesting theories that may help explain this phenomenon. 
One theory from the field of behavioural economics that may help explain commissions’ 
apparent bias to the status quo is the endowment effect theory.  The endowment effect occurs 
when an individual places a higher value on an asset once the individual has acquired property 
rights over the asset (Thaler 1980).  Perhaps those involved in the establishment and operation of 
a commission feel some sense of ownership over it and have therefore placed a high value on it.  
If commission directors, for example, suffer from the endowment effect, their perceived payoff 
to switching from refundable to non-refundable must be not only greater but sufficiently greater 
than the payoffs to the status quo in order to motivate change. 
Another theory that may explain commissions’ apparent status quo bias is cognitive 
dissonance (Festinger 1957 and Akerlof and Dickens 1982).  Cognitive dissonance refers to the 
unpleasant feeling one gets when holding two contradictory ideas.  Perhaps directors believe 
check-off reform would be beneficial but also believe reform could not be achieved.  In an 
attempt to reconcile the two conflicting ideas and reduce the dissonance they feel, they 
rationalize staying with the status quo by convincing themselves and others that switching is not 
a worthwhile venture. 
As well, the principal-agent problem may partially explain why commissions’ fail to 
convert to boards.  The principle-agent problem occurs when an agent working on behalf of a 
principal undertakes an action which the principal cannot observe and reduces the total amount 
consumption that can be divided between the two because it is advantageous for the agent to do 
so (Grossman and Hart 1983).  In the context of research check-offs, farmers are the principals 
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and the check-off program’s management (i.e., farmer-elected and executive directors), are the 
agents.  Perhaps commissions’ failure to switch to non-refundable check-offs is a reflection of 
information asymmetry and opportunistic behaviour on the part of check-off management. 
3.5 Summary and Conclusions 
Empirical studies consistently show high rates of return on investment in agricultural 
research which suggests agricultural research, in general, tends to be underfunded from society’s 
perspective.  Private underinvestment in agricultural research is often attributed to the non-
excludable and non-rival nature of the knowledge research creates.  One way governments 
attempt to induce additional private investment is by creating institutional arrangements that 
facilitate collective action by producers.  Commodity check-off programs are examples of this 
strategy.  Despite the sizable benefits of research, producers tend to underinvest and there are a 
number of possible reasons why.  The broad adoption and continued operation of refundable 
check-offs is one potentially important reason.  While the need for check-off reform is 
apparently needed, it has not yet occurred.  Chapter 4 develops a theoretical framework to 
examine why check-off agencies continue to administer refundable check-offs rather than 
switching to non-refundable check-offs.
41 
 
CHAPTER 4: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
4.1 Introduction 
As suggested in Chapter 3, producer underinvestment in crop research may be related to 
the choice to administer refundable check-offs.  Why then, do development commissions 
continue to administer refundable check-offs when they apparently have the ability to switch to 
development boards and administer non-refundable check-offs?  In this chapter, the theory of 
institutional change, which examines the creation, evolution, and choice of institutions, is used to 
develop a theoretical framework to inform this question. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized in three sections.  Section 4.2, “North’s 
Framework of Institutional Change,” examines Douglass C. North’s theory of institutional 
change.15
4.2 North’s Framework of Institutional Change 
  Section 4.3, “Arthur’s Framework of Technological Change,” describes W. Brian 
Arthur’s theory of technological change, upon which North’s theory of institutional change is 
partially based.  Four propositions based on the theories and concepts presented in the preceding 
sections are stated in the final section entitled, “Summary, Conclusions, and Propositions to 
Test.”  The validity of each proposition is tested in Chapter 5 using empirical evidence from 
producer check-off organizations. 
According to North, the process of institutional change is incremental, continuous, and 
path dependent.  It is endogenous; institutions alter organizations, which, in turn, alter 
institutions, and so on.  The path of institutional change does not necessarily lead to socially 
efficient outcomes and socially inefficient paths of development may persist and become “locked 
in” over time (North 1990). 
                                                 
15 Douglass C. North received the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1993 for his work in the field of economic history 
(Nobel Prize website). 
42 
 
According to North, “The continuous interaction between institutions and organizations 
in the economic setting of scarcity and hence competition is the key to institutional change” 
(1992, p. 4).  Institutions are the rules of the game – humanly devised constraints that structure 
human interaction (North 1990).  Institutions include formal rules such as laws, acts, and 
constitutions; informal social norms of behaviour such as conventions, traditions, customs, and 
codes of conduct; and the enforcement characteristics of each (North 1990).  Institutional, 
budgetary, technological and other economic constraints determine pay-offs in society.  These 
constraints define the way the game is played.  The role of institutions in society is to facilitate 
exchange between economic agents by reducing uncertainty and transaction costs (North 1990). 
Transactions, according to Williamson, occur “whenever a good or service is transferred 
across a technologically separable interface” (1985, p. 1).  The term “transaction costs” has many 
definitions.  For example, Coase described transaction costs as “the cost of using the price 
mechanism” (1937, p. 390).  Williamson thought of transaction costs as “the economic 
equivalent to friction in physical systems” (1985, p. 19).  Furubotn and Richter define transaction 
costs as “the costs of resources utilized for the creation, maintenance, use, and change of 
institutions and organizations” (1997, p. 40). 
Organizations are the players of the game; “groups of individuals bound by some 
common interest to achieve objectives” (North 1990, p. 5).  Organizations include economic 
bodies such as firms, unions, and co-operatives; political bodies such as political parties, 
governments, and regulatory agencies; and educational bodies such as schools, universities, and 
colleges (North 1990).  Generally speaking, the objective of an organization is to maximize 
member welfare or, using North’s sports analogy, to win the game (North 1990). 
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The types of organizations that arise, and the way they evolve, reflect the incentives 
embedded in the institutional framework (North 1994).  Since resources are scarce and 
competition is pervasive, to survive, organizations must continually invest in the skills and 
knowledge that have the greatest payoff (North 1994).  However, this does not mean that 
organizations will necessarily engage in socially productive activities.  According to North, 
If the highest rate of return in a society is to be made from piracy, then 
organizations will invest in knowledge and skills that will make them better 
pirates; if organizations realize the highest payoffs by increasing productivity then 
they will invest in skills and knowledge to achieve that objective. (1994, p. 3) 
Organizations’ welfare-maximizing behaviour continually alters the institutional 
framework.  Institutions change when entrepreneurs – the decision makers in organizations – 
perceive that altering the rules is superior to working within them (North 1994).  The decision to 
enact change is typically driven by changes in relative prices, tastes, and/or preferences (North 
1990).  Organizations will invest in changing formal rules – through lobbying political 
organizations for example – when it is perceived to be in the best interest of the organization.  
Informal constraints such as social norms of behaviour and codes of conduct will gradually 
change as the formal rules change. 
As the rules of the game change, so do individuals’ perceptions of the relative payoffs to 
different choices.  The way players interpret and process information evolves as they learn and 
develop skills that help them take advantage of the new rules (North 1993). 
Inefficient institutional arrangements can arise and become locked in.  According to 
North, “there are two forces shaping the path of institutional change: increasing returns and 
imperfect markets characterized by significant transaction costs” (1990, p. 95).  In a world with 
zero transaction costs, institutions do not affect economic outcomes (1990).  However in reality, 
transaction costs are not zero and thus do affect economic outcomes. 
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Transaction costs arise because “information is costly and asymmetrically held by the 
parties to exchange” (North 1992, p.4).  Markets, both economic and political, are not perfect.  
Agents often make decisions based on partial and sometimes incorrect information.  Inefficient 
property rights or institutions arise as a result. 
Inefficient institutions can become locked in as a result of increasing returns (North 
1990).  The process of institutional change creates an interdependent web of institutions and 
organizations (both political and economic), which North refers to as an “institutional matrix.”  
System self-reinforcement arises as a result of the symbiotic relationship between institutions 
and organizations.  This self-reinforcement biases the choices of individuals and organizations 
within the institutional matrix in favour of policies that are generally consistent with the status 
quo (North 1990).  Economies of scope, complementarities, and network externalities make the 
process of institutional change incremental and path dependent (North 1993).  Organizations that 
arise and have bargaining power as a result of the incentive structure inherent in the institutional 
framework typically have a vested interest in perpetuating the institutions that got them to where 
they are (North 1993). 
North’s concepts of institutional self-reinforcement, path dependence, and lock-in were 
based on ideas from Arthur (1988) who examined sources of technological self-reinforcement, 
path dependence, and lock-in.  Arthur’s (1988) sources of technological lock-in, which are 
discussed in greater detail below, are large set-up costs, learning effects, coordination effects, 
and adaptive expectations.  North (1990) claimed creating institutions typically involves 
significant set-up costs that create economies of scale.  Learning effects occur as organizations 
acquire skills and knowledge that helps them exploit the opportunities provided by the 
institutional framework.  Organizations coordinate their actions and behaviours with other 
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organizations through contracts and investments in complementary activities which create 
coordination effects.  Adaptive expectations arise as the increased prevalence of contracting 
forms expectations that future contracting will be possible under a similar institutional 
framework (North 1990).  North concludes that “the interdependent web of an institutional 
matrix produces massive increasing returns” (1990, p. 95). 
With increasing returns and imperfect markets characterized by high transaction costs,  
the subjective models of actors modified both by very imperfect feedback and by 
ideology will shape the path.  Then, not only can both divergent paths and persistently 
poor performance prevail, the historically derived perceptions of the actors shape the 
choices they make. (North 1990, p. 95–96) 
To better understand North’s theory of institutional change, it is useful to understand W. 
Brian Arthur’s theory of technological change. 
4.3. Arthur’s Framework of Technological Change 
North’s theory of institutional change, specifically, his concept of institutional lock-in, 
was based on W. Brian Arthur’s theory of technological change.  This section examines Arthur’s 
framework of technological change as it provides additional insight into North’s theory of 
institutional change and further develops the theoretical framework for analyzing producer-
controlled crop research check-offs. 
4.3.1 Arthur’s Model 
Arthur, in his influential 1989 article, “Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and 
Lock-in by Historical Events,” developed a simple model to examine the adoption process of two 
competing technologies in the presence of increasing returns to adoption.  The model consists of 
two new-to-market technologies – technology A and technology B – and two types of potential 
adopters – type R and type S.  The total number of adopters is large and there is an equal number 
of each type.  R-agents have a natural preference for technology A, thus, aR > bR.  S-agents have 
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a natural preference for technology B, hence, bS > aS (see Table 4-1).  The adoption process is 
sequential and the order in which R-agents and S-agents choose a technology is random.  Agents 
are fully informed of the relative payoffs to adoption and always choose the technology with the 
greatest return. 
Table 4-1. Returns to Choosing A or B given Previous Adoptions 
 Technology A Technology B 
R-agent aR + rnA bR + rnB 
S-agent aS + snA bS + snB 
Source: Arthur (1989, p.118) 
 
 
An agent’s return to adopting a particular technology increases as the number of previous 
adopters of the technology increases.  The variables r and s shown in Table 3-1 express the 
nature of the relationship between the returns to adopting a technology and the number of 
previous adopters.  In this particular case, both variables are assumed to be positive to reflect the 
increasing-return nature of adoption.  Variables nA and nB in Table 4-1 represent the number of 
previous adopters of technologies A and B respectively. 
With increasing returns, agents will not necessarily choose their preferred technology.  
For example, R-agents will begin choosing technology B even though technology A is their 
preferred technology when a sufficient number of previous adopters have also chosen technology 
B, and vice versa.  Once this tipping point in the adoption process is reached, each agent 
thereafter will choose the same technology.  Therefore, the adoption process becomes a “random 




Figure 4-1: Increasing Returns Adoption: A Random Walk with Absorbing Barriers 
Source: Arthur (1989, p.120) 
 
 
Arthur (1989) found that the adoption process under increasing returns to adoption 
possessed the following properties: 
1. Multiple equilibria.  With increasing returns to adoption, multiple market share outcomes 
are possible.  Eventually technology A or technology B will capture 100 per cent of the 
market share; however, it is not clear which of the two technologies will win.  More than 
one outcome is possible; therefore, multiple equilibria exist. 
2. Possible inefficiency.  With increasing returns, the technology that would provide the 
maximum possible benefit is not necessarily the one that is eventually chosen.  If the 
superior technology has bad luck gaining market share early on, the inferior alternative 
may accumulate enough of an advantage that the superior technology can no longer 
compete. 
3. Path Dependent.  With increasing returns to adoption, the adoption process is path 
dependent.  In Arthur’s model, the order in which adopters choose matters.  If a 




adopting technology A will increase to the point where S-agents will also choose 
technology A.  Under the condition of increasing returns, small, seemingly unimportant 
events, such as the decision regarding the order in which agents adopt, can determine the 
eventual outcome. 
4. Lock-in.  With increasing returns to adoption, the technology that moves ahead in market 
share may eventually become locked in.  The path of adoption becomes more and more 
difficult to reverse as overall adoption increases. 
In summary, Arthur (1989) showed that when two technologies, each exhibiting 
increasing returns to adoption, compete for market share, the outcome is unpredictable, the 
superior technology does not necessarily win, small events can tip the adoption process in favour 
of one technology over another, and the eventual winner may become locked in. 
4.3.2 Arthur’s Sources of Lock-in 
Arthur (1988) identified four generic sources of technological self-reinforcement and 
lock-in.  North (1990) later argued that each of these sources also create institutional lock-in.  
Arthur’s (1988) four sources are as follows: 
1. Large set-up costs.  Large set-up or fixed costs to establishing an economic system are a 
self-reinforcing mechanism because they can lead to unit cost reductions with increased 
production. 
2. Learning effects.  Learning effects occur when agents acquire skills and knowledge that 
improve the overall performance of an economic system. 
3. Coordination effects.  Coordination effects occur when there are benefits to going along 
with others. 
4. Adaptive expectations.  Adaptive expectations occur when the increased prevalence of a 
technology on the market leads to beliefs of further prevalence. 
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4.3.3 Escaping Lock-in 
The ability to escape lock-in depends on the “source of the self-reinforcing mechanism” 
and “the degree to which the advantages accrued by the inferior ‘equilibrium’ are reversible or 
transferable to an alternative one” (Arthur 1988, p. 16).  When large set-up costs and learning 
effects are the sources of self-reinforcement, the benefits are often not reversible or transferable, 
making it difficult to escape from the locked-in position (Arthur 1988).  However, when 
coordination effects are the source, the ability to escape lock-in depends on the degree of 
certainty each user has with respect to the preferences of the other users (Farrell and Saloner 
1985, 1986).  If users who prefer to switch are certain that the other users also prefer to switch, 
they will do so independently; presumably, at low cost.  However, if users are uncertain whether 
or not other users prefer to switch, then the installed base may remain locked in as switching 
would be costly.  According to Arthur, “each user would benefit from switching to the other 
standard, as long as others go along, but individually none dare to change in case others do not 
follow” (1988, p.16).  With uncertainty, transferability of coordination benefits is difficult to 
achieve and coordination failure results. 
4.4 Summary, Conclusions, and Propositions to Test 
North describes institutional change as an endogenous process.  Institutions determine the 
payoffs in society and therefore affect the types of organizations that arise.  Organizations invest 
in skills and knowledge in an attempt to capitalize on the opportunities provided by the existing 
institutional framework.  Through their maximizing behaviour, organizations incrementally alter 
the institutional framework at the margins they perceive have the greatest payoff.  Imperfect 
markets, characterized by significant transaction costs, mean that inefficient property rights can 
arise.  Increasing returns to institutions make the process of institutional change path dependent 
50 
 
and subject to lock-in.  Together, transaction costs and increasing returns mean that inefficient 
institutions can persist over time.  
Arthur showed how increasing returns create multiple equilibria, possible inefficiency, 
path dependence, and lock-in.  Arthur also identified four sources of lock-in – large set-up costs, 
learning effects, coordination effects, and adaptive expectations.  In regard to escaping lock-in, 
Arthur (1988) stressed the importance of the reversibility and transferability of the benefits that 
increasing returns provide.  While self-reinforcing mechanisms cause lock-in, the ability to 
escape lock-in depends on the degree to which the advantages these mechanisms create are 
reversible or transferable to an alternative equilibrium. 
Evidence presented in this thesis suggests commissions may suffer from lock-in.  
Theoretical and anecdotal evidence supports the notion that switching to non-refundable check-
offs may allow producer-controlled crop development organizations to fund research at higher 
levels.  Yet to date, none have switched, suggesting that these organizations may be locked in to 
administering refundable check-offs. 
There are at least two ways to examine lock-in.  One way is to examine how a system 
that seems to be locked in became locked in over time.  The lock-in story, in this case, would be 
a dynamic one.  In the context of crop development agencies, this approach would involve 
examining the histories of the commissions and the check-off system as a whole with a focus on 
how they got to where they are. 
Another way to examine lock-in would be to take a more static or steady-state approach.  
In this case, the focus would be more on whether the system as it is today can change, as 
opposed to how the system become locked in.  The current locked-in state of the system would 
therefore be the starting point with this approach. 
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While it would be interesting to explore the more dynamic story of how these check-offs 
evolved, the more static approach was taken.  To test the lock-in hypothesis, the presence of the 
sources of lock-in outlined above was examined.  The analysis was framed in the test of four 
hypotheses; each one related to one of Arthur’s self-reinforcing mechanisms.  Each proposition 
presented below was tested and presented in Chapter 5.  The identification of the sources of 
check-off lock-in not only informs the question of whether commissions are locked in, it 
facilitates a discussion of policy measures that could be used to escape lock-in. 
Proposition 1: Large set-up or fixed costs contribute to check-off lock-in.  If the cost of 
setting up a refundable check-off are large and cannot be transferred to a non-refundable system, 
then large set-up costs contribute to check-off lock-in. 
Proposition 2: Learning effects contribute to check-off lock-in.  If experience leads to the 
acquisition of knowledge and skills that improve the overall performance of the established 
refundable check-off system, and these improvements are not transferable to a non-refundable 
system, then learning effects contribute to check-off lock-in. 
Proposition 3: Coordination effects contribute to check-off lock-in.  If there are benefits 
from coordinating the establishment and operation of a refundable check-off system, and these 
benefits are not transferable to a non-refundable check-off system, then coordination effects 
contribute to check-off lock-in. 
Proposition 4: Adaptive expectations contribute to check-off lock-in.  If the increased 
prevalence of refundable check-offs enhances the belief of further prevalence, then adaptive 
expectations contribute to check-off lock-in.
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CHAPTER 5: ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
5.1 Introduction 
A qualitative analysis was conducted to test the four propositions stated in Chapter 4.  
Data for the analysis were collected through personal interviews with key informants and 
external review of publicly available information.  This chapter discusses the methodology of the 
study and presents the results of the analysis.  The remainder of this chapter is divided into six 
sections.  Section 5.2 discusses the methodology and data collection methods used in the study.  
Section 5.3 examines the validity of Proposition 1: Large set-up costs contribute to check-off 
lock-in.  Section 5.4 examines the validity of Proposition 2: Learning effects contribute to check-
off lock-in.  Section 5.5 examines the validity of Proposition 3: Coordination effects contribute 
to check-off lock-in.  Section 5.6 examines the validity of Proposition 4: Adaptive expectations 
contribute to check-off lock-in.  Section 5.7 summarizes the findings from each of the four 
previous sections.  Final conclusions and a discussion on the policy implications of the findings 
are reported in Chapter 6. 
5.2 Methodology and Data Collection 
The hypothesis is that development commissions suffer from institutional lock-in that 
inhibits conversion from a commission to a board.  To test this hypothesis, four propositions 
based on Arthur’s taxonomy of sources of lock-in – large set-up costs, learning effects, 
coordination effects, and adaptive expectations – were examined systematically.  Published 
information and qualitative data collected from interviews with individuals involved in crop 
research check-off organizations was analyzed to examine each proposition. 
Interviews with 18 individuals were conducted to collect information for the study.  
Executive and farmer-elected directors of crop development commissions and a member of the 
Agri-Food Council were interviewed either in person or over the phone.  Interviewees had 
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knowledge of specific events and facts that could contribute to lock-in.  Perhaps more 
importantly, these individuals and individuals like them are responsible for making decisions 
regarding check-off reform; therefore, their perceptions are very important for the change 
process. 
The interviews were structured in a similar way, but varied somewhat as particular 
responses warranted additional follow-up questions and discussion.  While interviews were 
structured to elicit a clear picture of the participants’ perceptions regarding the four propositions, 
there was enough flexibility in the qualitative process to allow respondents to discuss a broader 
range of issues. 
The interview process was developed to be consistent with University Standards and 
received Ethics approval from the University of Saskatchewan.  All participants signed a consent 
form as reproduced in Appendix D.  All interviews were audio recorded and all were transcribed 
except one, which could not be transcribed due to poor audio quality.  The average interview 
took approximately one hour.  The recordings and transcripts are securely stored according to 
University policy. 
After two separate and interesting experiences, a deliberate decision was made to 
interview only those directly involved in check-off organizations.  The first experience occurred 
at an annual crop production show in Saskatoon while attempting to survey producers on their 
attitudes toward check-offs.  Many farmers approached at the show were very reluctant to 
discuss their attitudes about check-offs and indicated they had virtually no knowledge of 




The second experience was the experiment on informational impacts on producers’ 
check-off preferences mentioned in section 3.4.1.  The results of this experiment suggested that 
information regarding the benefits of research has a positive impact on producer support for 
higher check-off rates and non-refundable check-offs.  The results of this experiment also 
suggested that producers are largely uninformed of the benefits of crop research and check-offs 
in general.  This finding was consistent with what researcher Eric Froystad and supervisor Dr. 
Richard Gray found after the attempt to survey farmers at the crop production show in 
Saskatoon. 
These two experiences, combined with the fact that producers would only be involved in 
a decision to change check-offs after a period of engagement that would alter their information 
sets and perceptions, suggested that it was important to discuss research check-offs with those 
directly involved in producer check-off organizations.  The leaders of check-off organizations 
would have to initiate any process of change and as such are key agents of change. 
5.3 Proposition 1: Large set-up costs contribute to check-off lock-in. 
The evidence collected in this study supports Proposition 1 – large set-up costs contribute 
to check-off lock-in.  Information gathered through a review of the legislation regarding the 
establishment of a development commission, as well as through interviews with key informants, 
suggested establishing a refundable check-off is a time consuming, complex, and arduous 
process that involves considerable risk.  Evidence also indicated switching from a commission to 
a board requires significant resources and groups must go through a process similar to that of 
establishing a commission in the first place.  Since there are large fixed costs to establishing a 
refundable check-off, and groups must reinvest significant resources to switch to a non-
refundable check-off, large set-up costs contribute to check-off lock-in. 
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5.3.1 Establishing a Development Commission 
Before a group of producers can legally begin collecting a refundable check-off in 
Saskatchewan, they must first establish themselves as a development commission.  The process 
for establishing a development commission is defined in the provincial Agri-Food Regulations, 
2004. 
The first step for a group seeking the establishment of a development commission is to 
file a request and submit a proposed plan to the provincial Minister of Agriculture.  The proposal 
must include a detailed description of the proposed plan; the proposed membership of an interim 
board of directors to administer the plan until the first election of a board of directors; a list of 
the proposed powers of the agency; the fiscal year of the agency; and any other information the 
Minister deems necessary, such as the grade or class of product that is to be promoted, 
developed, or regulated; the objectives of the plan; who and what areas of Saskatchewan would 
be affected by the plan; who would be exempt from the plan; and a detailed description of how 
the check-off is to be collected, administered, and audited (Government of Saskatchewan website 
a). 
Once the proposal is developed and submitted to the Minister, it is forwarded to the Agri-
Food Council for review.  During this stage, the Council may meet with proponents of the plan; 
request further information on the proposal, including details on what portion of the industry 
would be affected by the plan (in terms of the number of producers and the acreage); request 
information; and/or hold public hearings for the purpose of receiving representations supporting 
or opposing the establishment of the plan.  Proponents are required to demonstrate to the Council 
the level of industry support for the proposed plan.  Once the Council’s review of the proposal is 
complete, the Council recommends to the Minister that either, the plan should be established 
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without a vote of producers, the plan should not be established, or a vote of producers should be 
held (Government of Saskatchewan 2004b). 
The rules state that if a producer plebiscite is held, 60 per cent of producers who vote 
must vote in favour of the proposed plan for it to be eligible for establishment.  However, the 
Minister has the power to impose additional constraints on the vote.  For example, the Minister 
may set the minimum number of votes required to be cast, or the percentage of the producers 
eligible to vote that must vote, in order for the vote to be valid.  If a valid vote is held and the 
results indicate a sufficient level of producer support for the plan, the Minister may either 
recommend the establishment of the plan or decide that the plan should not be established 
(Government of Saskatchewan 2004b). 
Responses from those interviewed suggested the process for establishing a development 
commission is difficult, time consuming, and requires significant resources.  When describing 
the effort that was required to create a check-off, one interviewee said, “We went to great 
lengths…and I’m sure the other Commissions did as well.”16  Another interviewee said, “It took 
a lot of work and a long time to get it [the Commission] up and established…over a matter of 
years.”17
According to one interviewee, one reason why it is difficult to establish a development 
commission is because it is difficult to find producers willing to serve on a board of directors.  
The interviewee explained: 
 
Farmer support is a major issue and I think also, with all of these boards 
[agencies] now; it’s getting extremely difficult to find good people who want to 
fill positions on boards of directors.  The simple reason for that is farms are 
getting larger…most of the people I see around the board table are in their fifties 
plus.  The odd one is younger.  But what is happening is they are just becoming so 
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busy with their own operation that they find it very difficult to give any time to 
these boards [agencies] in the first place.18
Another interviewee commented on the difficulties of convincing those involved in the 
decision (farmers, regulators, and politicians) to support a proposed plan, and the risk involved in 
the establishment process.  The interviewee said: 
 
As far as the Agri-Food Council, they need to…be very clear that farmers support 
it [the plan] and so I know when we were trying to develop the AAA council 
[Commission], we did a lot of extra meetings.  We did a lot more that we felt we 
needed to, to bring about the AAA Commission.  At the end of the day we were 
still worried that the board [Council] might not side with us.  After that, the board 
[Council] was really concerned that the government might not be onside with it so 
they wanted us to make sure that both parties were onside and that there would be 
no ugly questions asked during question period.  So yes, there is definitely a 
political dimension to these things that make it easier or worse.  It is definitely a 
concern because you can go to all this work and the whole thing can get kinda 
parked because it looks like it might be a “hot potato.”19
The perception is that the government will only support the creation of a development 
commission if a significant portion of farmers do not oppose it. 
 
5.3.2 Switching from Commission to Board 
The legislation does not clearly define the process for switching from a development 
commission to a development board.  However, since an agency’s regulations give it the power 
to collect a refundable levy, it is assumed that a development commission would have to amend 
its regulations to a switch to a development board.  The excerpt below, which was taken from the 
Agri-Food Council website, describes the process for amending agency regulations and orders:  
When a Board/Commission wants to amend either its regulations or orders, it 
must prove to The Agri-Food Council that the recommended changes are not only 
beneficial, but also necessary and supported by producers.  In order to amend 
regulations, the board must first prove to the Council that the recommended 
changes are beneficial for the agency (including its producers).  Upon convincing 
the Council that the recommended changes are beneficial and necessary to the 
agency, the Council will vote to either pass them or not.  If accepted, the Council 
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then forwards the recommended changes to the provincial government bodies that 
debates the changes and either recommends further changes, approves the 
changes or disallows the changes requested.  If accepted by the provincial 
government bodies, the changes are then forwarded to the Executive Council and 
the Lieutenant Governor in Council for their approval/denial.  If approved, the 
amendments are considered changed on the date of signing by the Lieutenant 
Governor.  (Government of Saskatchewan website a) 
Interviewees indicated that switching from commission to board would involve 
significant time, effort, and resources, and that the process would be similar to the process for 
establishing a development commission in the first place.  According to one interviewee 
switching to a board is like “starting it all over again only as a ‘mandatory’ [non-refundable] 
rather than a refundable.”20  The interviewee went on to say, “I don’t see any shortcuts…I don’t 
see any way that you could shortcut it and make it simple even though you were an operating 
commission.”21
One interviewee described the process for switching as “a very significant…[and] 
…difficult administrative procedure to go through.”
 
22  The interviewee added that the perception 
is that once a refundable check-off agency is established, “it’s sort of fixed in law that it’s a 
refundable one [check-off] and away we go.”23  Switching to a development board “requires a 
very long procedure and, in short form, a lot of red tape.”24
Switching from commission to board, in another interviewee’s opinion, “would take like 
a tremendous amount of energy and resources from both the board of directors and staff of the 
organization.”
 
25  This interviewee felt that the chances of being successful in a bid to switch 
were not great enough “to put that much energy behind that.”26
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22 Transcript 17. 
23 Transcript 17. 
24 Transcript 17. 
25 Transcript 9. 
26 Transcript 9. 
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Another interviewee said that switching would involve “a long row of a lot of work and 
at very significant expense…. [A] lot of this work would be primarily done by paid employees 
out of the Commission and it would chalk up a lot of hours.”27
Other interviewees also suggested that the process for switching was too onerous to 
pursue.  One interviewee said, 
 
To try get the levy non-refundable or to try increase the levy, most of us know 
how hard it was to get the Commission established in the first place.  You just 
breathe a great big sigh of relief when it’s done because now you can go on doing 
other things.  I think for a number of reasons there is just not the will at the board 




You could try it [to switch from commission to board] but still it’s the legislation 
thing.  Like your office personnel, I’m not sure what it would take…. I’m not sure 
the investment would be worth it.  It would likely cost us ten thousand bucks in 
personnel hours to get this thing rolling and then you have the fight on your 
hands.  Status quo is always the easiest to do.  It doesn’t cost you anything.  It 
doesn’t take any effort, just stay where you are.29
Switching from refundable to non-refundable involves risk for a commission as 
significant time and effort can be invested in a campaign to switch and there is no guarantee that 
the proposal will be passed.  When asked why commissions have not altered their check-offs to 
generate more funding for research one interviewee commented, “I just think that most 
commissions are, I guess for lack of a better word, scared…because you have to get a producer 
vote on it.”
 
30  The participant later said, “I guess the reason or the very short answer to the 
reason why a lot of commissions don’t go out and ask for more money, I think, is because they 
are afraid it wouldn’t happen.”31
                                                 
27 Transcript 17. 
 
28 Transcript 12. 
29 Transcript 14. 
30 Transcript 12. 
31 Transcript 12. 
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When discussing the risks involved with switching from development commission to 
development board one participant commented, 
I’d have to have a lot of legal counseling and a couple rum before I went out 
there…  If we ask that question and we lost the vote, would we lose the 
commission?  Would we lose the status that we have or would we go back to the 
status that we have?  That would be a huge threat.  Huge threat.32
When asked whether risk is a factor in the decision to switch, one interviewee said, 
 
Bottom line, yes, and some significant benefits would have to be identified before 
it would be worthwhile taking that risk…  I would highly doubt that any of them 
[other crop development commissions] would make the application to change to a 
compulsory given the current climate within which we are operating.33
It should be noted that these interviewee comments reflect a number of issues besides 
large fixed costs, such as a strong status quo bias and risk aversion on the part of farmers, 
commissions and the Agri-Food Council.  These concepts are discussed in greater depth in 
Chapter 6. 
 
5.3.3 Proposition 1: Summary and Conclusions 
In summary, evidence suggests large set-up costs contribute to check-off lock-in.  A 
review of the steps involved in the process to establish a development commission, as well as 
evidence from interviews, suggests establishing a refundable check-off is a time consuming, 
complex, and somewhat arduous process fraught with risk.  As such, there are significant fixed 
costs to establishing a plan, particularly given the producer support requirement.  Evidence also 
suggests that switching from a commission to a board involves going through many of the same 
regulatory steps over again.  Therefore, large set-up costs contribute to check-off lock-in. 
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5.4 Proposition 2: Learning effects contribute to check-off lock-in. 
Learning effects occur when the acquisition of skills and knowledge improves the overall 
performance of a system.  When learning effects are specific to a particular system or process, 
switching to an alternative can be difficult.  However, when knowledge and skills can be easily 
applied to an alternative process, learning effects do no impede change (Arthur 1988). 
Learning effects can occur at multiple levels within a check-off’s institutional structure.  
To examine Proposition 2, this analysis examined learning effects at the producer, commission, 
and Agri-Food Council level. 
Evidence collected in this study does not support Proposition 2 – learning effects 
contribute to check-off lock-in.  Learning at each level of a check-off’s institutional structure 
improves commissions’ overall performance; however, these learning effects are transferable to 
boards and, thus, do not support check-off lock-in. 
5.4.1 Producer-level Learning Effects 
Evidence suggests learning effects at the producer level do not contribute to check-off 
lock-in.  When a commodity check-off is introduced, producers learn what they are contributing 
to; what activities their contributions are funding; the rules regarding voting and refund requests; 
voting deadlines and procedures, etc.  According to one interviewee, farmers “go through a 
process of education” when a check-off is introduced and they learn that “we are taking some 
money from them for R&D and if they want it back, they can get it back; there is a process to do 
that…. That was a barrier at first for sure.”34
There are two reasons why producer-level learning effects are not significant sources of 
check-off lock-in.  First, advantages that arise as a result of producer learning are likely small in 
magnitude.  That is, the knowledge and skills that producers acquire through experience with 
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refundable check-off programs likely does not improve the overall performance of a commission 
in a material way.  Second, any skills and knowledge that producers acquire through their 
interactions and transactions with commissions are likely transferable to a board or non-
refundable regime.  For example, producers would not have to learn new skills to participate in a 
non-refundable check-off program.  Therefore, producer-level learning effects do not contribute 
to check-off lock-in. 
5.4.2 Commission-level Learning Effects 
Evidence suggests learning effects at the commission level do not contribute to check-off 
lock-in.  As commission employees and directors gain experience in their roles, they acquire 
skills and knowledge that make them more efficient at completing their tasks.  For directors, 
allocating funding to research projects is an important and complex function that has to be 
learned: 
We need to make sure that we’re picking research projects that fulfill a more 
pressing need.  I mean, there’s quite a number of areas where we could spend 
some research money, but we want to make sure that we’re picking the most 
important ones and in addition to that we also need to consider whether a 
particular research project is more important than another or not.  We need to 
assess whether there is the opportunity to get better value for that investment than 
a similar investment on a project that might be more pressing to us, but there’s not 
a research opportunity immediately available.  So we, we have to weigh those 
things.35
One interviewee indicated that the many demands for funding from research agencies 
make the job of distributing funding difficult.  “The question is, even if you raised more money 
where do we allocate it to?  You know, where is it [check-off funding] best spent?  Because there 
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Whether producer contributions can be leveraged with complementary funding from 
industry and/or government agencies is another important consideration for directors when they 
are allocating funding: 
Another aspect of us making decisions about just which projects to fund and how 
to best spend our money is the opportunity for any matching grants that might be 
available from other agencies – obviously government being the primary one.  
But we have to make sure that we’re making best use of those opportunities and 
coordinating with other research that’s being done: not just specific AAA 
research, but in other areas that that might compliment what we’re doing from 
another jurisdiction.37
Experience makes directors more efficient and effective at leveraging producer dollars 
with government matching grants.  Check-off managers and directors learn about the various 
programs and funding opportunities that are available.  They learn how to write proposals, and 
perhaps most importantly, how to effectively lobby for government support.  “You have to make 
sure that you’re the wheel that gets greased…and you get good at that after a while…you know 
which buttons to push.”
 
38
Evidence suggests that as directors gain experience the overall performance of a 
refundable check-off program improves.  With experience, directors become more effective at 
making funding allocation decisions and attracting matching grants to leverage producer 
contributions.  However, these skills are as useful for a director of a development board as they 
are for a director of a development commission.  Since commission-level learning effects are 
transferable to a board they are not a significant source of check-off lock-in. 
 
5.4.3 Council-level Learning Effects 
There is no evidence that learning effects at the Agri-Food Council level support check-
off lock-in.  One of the Council’s many roles is to assist producer groups with establishing 
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check-offs (Government of Saskatchewan website a).  Given the complexity of the process for 
establishing a commission, as outlined in Section 5.3.1, this role likely requires a certain degree 
of expertise that comes with experience.  Experience has likely improved the Council’s capacity 
to help groups establish refundable check-offs but it has also likely improved the Council’s 
capacity to help groups establish non-refundable check-offs as well since the two processes are 
very similar.  This type of learning is not specific to the establishment of refundable check-offs; 
therefore, learning effects at the Agri-Food Council level are likely not a significant contributor 
to check-off lock-in. 
5.4.4 Proposition 2: Summary and Conclusions 
Evidence collected to analyze learning effects suggests that learning effects are not a 
significant source of check-off lock-in.  Through experience, producers, directors, and council 
members acquire knowledge and skills that improve the overall performance of their respective 
refundable check-off programs and the check-off system in general.  However, since 
development boards and commissions are very similar with respect to the way they are 
established, operate, and organized; these learning effects benefit both commissions and boards.  
These learning effects are transferable to boards, thus do not contribute to check-off lock-in. 
5.5 Proposition 3: Coordination effects contribute to check-off lock-in. 
Coordination effects, which occur when there are benefits to going along with others, are 
a source of lock-in (Arthur 1988).  In an institutional context, coordination effects occur when an 
individual, or a group of individuals, benefits from following a rule as a result of others doing the 
same.  With coordination effects, those not following the rule have an incentive to follow the rule 
and those already following the rule have an added incentive to continue to do so.  This in turn 
encourages even more participation, creating a cycle of positive feedback.  Breaking this cycle 
becomes increasing difficult as more individuals coordinate their actions with the group. 
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Data gathered to analyze Proposition 3, suggests coordination effects contribute to check-
off lock-in.  Check-off programs have coordinated with one another by structuring their check-
off programs in a similar way.  Now that refundable check-offs have become the de facto 
standard, it is more difficult for prospective groups to establish themselves as a board or for 
existing commissions to switch to boards. 
5.5.1 Evidence of Coordination Effects 
Refundable check-offs have become the de facto standard in Saskatchewan.  Of the 
province’s nine crop check-off programs, only the pulse check-off – the first check-off 
established in the province – is non-refundable.  Every check-off established since then has taken 
the refundable route. 
There are benefits when agencies structure their check-off mechanisms in a similar way.  
Producers are often subject to multiple check-offs and, as a result, have come to expect that 
check-offs operate in a similar manner.  Designing a check-off program to be the same as other 
existing programs can make it easier to attain producer acceptance, thereby reducing the risk 
associated with establishing a check-off.  It is likely less costly for a commodity group to 
establish a commission and operate a refundable check-off program now that many other 
commodity groups are doing the same. 
Evidence from interviews suggests that some groups designed their check-offs to be the 
same as others to reduce the risk associated with establishing a check-off.  When asked, why did 
your group adopt a refundable check-off and the levy rate it did, one respondent said, 
I think basically it was more just, rather than actually trying to take a look at the 
true needs for research within the crop, we probably based it more on what other 
commissions were doing and then what we felt would be palatable at the grower 
level.  You know you could argue that…maybe we should have tried to go a little 
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higher but you just always have that in the back of your mind…let’s get this thing 
on a level that we can get, that the farmers will support.39
Now that refundable levies have been broadly accepted by the farm community, support 
for non-refundable levies has diminished.  When discussing the topic of support for non-
refundable check-offs, one interviewee said, 
 
There is some dissatisfaction in the farm community about the pulse check-off 
and the fact that it’s mandatory and the impression – whether it’s right or not, but 
the perception is out there – that they conduct themselves in a manner that is 
reflective of the fact that they’re aware that it’s mandatory – somewhat heavy 
handed and don’t maybe communicate as much and I think part of that is like 
what I talked about earlier, just because it is a value-based check-off.  It is a 
massive amount of money and for certain growers growing high-risk crops it is 
like an incredible sum.  So, you know all of that does really does speak to…some 
of the benefits of it all being voluntary across the board.  I feel like it’s not a level 
playing field though, you know, it’s incongruent completely that the pulse check-
off is mandatory and none of the others are.40
On the same topic, another interviewee commented, 
 
You made some reference before about…moving to a non-refundable check-off. 
Absolutely no power and ability at this point in time, and I don’t know if there 
ever will be, in forcing a non-refundable check-off onto the ag community… I 
think pulse did it back in…and I’m just surprised it hasn’t been repealed, but…if 
we all can’t move that direction…they can stay alone by themselves.41
Reduced support for non-refundable levies makes it more difficult to convince producers, 
regulators, and politicians to support a switch.  Interviewees suggested that generating support 
for non-refundable levies from farmers would be difficult: 
 
I think we first have to convince farmers, show them the benefit of these producer 
check-offs.  You know, show them that there’s a real benefit – long-term and 
short-term.  Convince them.  You know, open their minds.  So far, we as farmers 
just see the check-off taken off and that’s all we see.  That’s first and foremost, 
but we don’t think about further down the line what’s actually happened with the 
money.  We have to change the attitude first.  Like, shift the paradigm.42
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Another interviewee suggested that generating support for a non-refundable check-off 
from directors would be “a major stumbling block”: 
I think personally, and I don’t mean to speak for other directors, but I’m not sure 
that anyone would have this idea that we should change it, that the other directors 
would entertain the option.  So I think first of all they’d have to convince all the 
other directors in that association, which would be a major stumbling block.  
Secondly, I don’t know whether anybody is really convinced that it would be a 
good idea because it hasn’t been a big problem in refunds and thirdly it would, 
even if you had the whole board convinced, it would still be a long row of a lot of 
work and at very significant expense because, probably, a lot of this work would 
be primarily done by paid employees out of the commission and it would chalk up 
a lot of hours.43
Convincing the government to support check-off reform may also be difficult since 
producers may view a switch to a non-refundable/mandatory check-off as an infringement on 
their personal right to choose.  When discussing this notion, one interviewee said, 
 
You’ve got both the provincial government of the day at the time and it can be 
both the opposition and the sitting party that can raise a bunch of stink about this 
and, therefore, make it a bit of a political “hot potato.”  Therefore, no one wants to 
touch it.  So on the political side, yes, it definitely could be a problem.44
A lack of support for non-refundable check-offs means that check-off groups would have 
to be creative in finding ways to garner support for change.  One interviewee suggested 
switching may require an “all-commodity” approach: 
 
I think timing would be important.  I think it would also be interesting to see, if 
people were going to do that…to have an all-commodity [group] going together, 
and saying, “okay, this is where we are going” and not just directing it to your 
AAA but also directing it to your BBB.… I think farmer-to-farmer conversation 
would be extremely important.  I think you also have to show…demonstration 
and grass-root involvement of those farmers would help you move along better.45
It may be less costly for a commission to switch if other agencies had already switched or 
were in the process arguing for change.  Coordination among commissions may be not only 
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useful but crucial given the need for a coordinated response from farmers.  As such, the cost of 
convincing a sufficient number of producers, directors, regulators, and politicians that change is 
not only necessary but required, would be greater if it were attempted alone than if it were 
attempted with others.  Once the argument for change has been made, others could follow.  One 
interviewee suggested that if one of the larger refundable check-off programs decided to switch 
to a non-refundable check-off it “would trigger a wholesale change in looking at all the check-
offs and how they’re all doing business”46
Change could be imposed by the government; however, for one interviewee, a push for 
check-off reform would have to come from producers: 
 
Well, I prefer to be top-down simply because that’s the simplest way to do it.  In 
all reality the world doesn’t work that way and I think probably it would have to 
be a small ground-swell request from the bottom-up.  I think is probably how it 
would have to happen and the government would probably listen and I’m not 
talking about just the board of directors I’m talking about the, in the case of AAA, 
if there was 50 per cent of the AAA growers signed a petition or something to that 
effect.  That would be a start.47
Later in the interview the study participant added: 
 
I would hope at some point in time the government would get some balls and just 
declare all check-offs non-refundable.  I really think they could do that without a 
lot of backlash.  But I don’t know that…that there’s been a group of commissions 
that have gotten together to go lobby the government to do that or anything.  I’m 
not aware of it anyway.  To me that would be a good start.  Just take all of the risk 
out of it and just make a simple decree that all check-offs are nonrefundable.48
5.5.3 Proposition 3: Summary and Conclusions 
 
Evidence collected to analyze coordination effects validates Proposition 3 – coordination 
effects contribute to check-off lock-in.  Commission-style check-offs have become the dominant 
check-off model in Saskatchewan.  These groups structured their check-off programs in a similar 
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way, which was beneficial as it lowered establishment and operating costs.  Interviewees 
indicated that they based their check-off design decisions on what other agencies had done 
before them and what they believed producers would accept.  Now that the vast majority of 
check-off agencies operate as commissions, it is more difficult for prospective check-off groups 
to establish themselves as development boards and for existing commissions to switch to boards.  
Therefore, coordination effects contribute to check-off lock-in. 
5.6 Proposition 4: Adaptive expectations contribute to check-off lock-in. 
Adaptive expectations act as a self-reinforcing mechanism when agents adapt their 
actions and beliefs in ways that help make expected outcomes actual outcomes (Pierson 2000).  
Adaptive expectations lead to technological lock-in when the increased prevalence of a particular 
technology on the market enhances agents’ beliefs of its superiority over other technologies 
(Arthur 1988).  When increased prevalence of contracting based on a specific set of rules reduces 
uncertainties regarding the permanence of the rules, adaptive expectations create institutional 
lock-in (North 1990).  Perhaps, the broad adoption and continued operation of refundable check-
offs has altered agents’ perceptions in a way that reinforces the status quo and thus discourages 
conversion to non-refundable check-offs.  Perhaps, commissions’ failure to convert to non-
refundable check-offs is, in part, a self-fulfilling prophecy driven by the expectations of the 
agents involved. 
5.6.1 Beliefs Regarding Whether Switching is a Practical Option 
Interviewees indicated that the topic of converting to non-refundable check-offs has been 
rarely, if ever, discussed or considered at the board-of-directors level.  While there are many 
reasons why that might be, responses from interviewees suggested that adaptive expectations are 
a contributing factor. 
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According to one interviewee, the topic of converting to a development board is “not 
something that comes up” at director meetings.  The interviewee explained that when the check-
off was established, the perception was that “the root of trying to go non-refundable was not 
practical and open anymore.”49
When discussing why conversion is not considered, the interviewee explained, 
 
These are the rules and this is where we’re at…so there’s no thought process of 
“oh let’s go that route.”  The mindset is that the rules are so onerous that that isn’t 
going to happen…. We’re not going to get it and nobody else setting up a new 
one is going to get one that’s non-refundable in this environment, but I don’t 
know how that meshes with the actual rules or what Agri-Food Council would 
require. 50
Others believe that producers’ preferences with respect to voluntary versus compulsory 
farm programs have shifted in favour of voluntary.  When asked if there was a chance that any 
commission would switch from refundable to non-refundable, another interviewee commented, 
 
I think it’s highly unlikely.  It seems that if there’s any movement on any of those 
kinds of issues, whether it is levy collection or any of those kinds of things, I 
think the general – if there’s a general shift at all – it’s away from things that are 
mandatory.  You know, voluntary participation in farm programs…. I think…any 
shift that there may be would be away from mandatory provisions and towards a 
little more flexibility.51
One interviewee said, “when I listen to some of the federal debate against the Canadian 
Wheat Board, you know that’s definitely, that’s a line drawn in the sand…. If we were all going 




                                                 
49 Transcript 11. 
 
50 Transcript 11. 
51 Transcript 3. 
52 Transcript 2. 
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Whether a switch from commission to board can be achieved is not known with certainty.  
However, because directors perceive that switching is not a practical option, the topic is never 
discussed, which reinforces the belief that switching cannot occur. 
5.6.2 Beliefs Regarding Whether Switching is Necessary 
The belief that converting from a commission to a board is not practical – either because 
the rules are too onerous or because preferences for choice have changed – were not the only 
reasons interviewees gave in regard to why their respective commissions have not considered 
switching.  Some argued that switching is not necessary because they feel current funding and 
refund levels are acceptable.  These arguments were often based on comparisons of current 
funding and refund levels to past funding and refund levels. 
When discussing what conditions would warrant a switch to a non-refundable check-off, 
one interviewee said, “As long as we’re generating a reasonable amount of income, which we’ve 
done.… We work within our means.”53
When discussing why commissions, in general, have not switched to non-refundable 
check-offs another interviewee said, 
 
I’m not sure that anyone has really sort of felt the real urge to change to a non-
refundable because, generally speaking, refunds haven’t been – I don’t think any 
of them have ever approached 10%.  If they did get to 10 or even as high as 25 
then it would become a large red flag and somebody would have to address that.  
Either change the way they’re spending money so that the people asking for 
refunds are more satisfied, or do a better job of advertising how this money is 
spent and convince the people that are asking for refunds that that’s not a good 
idea, or to try to change to a nonrefundable one.54
The expectations of those involved in check-off programs (farmers, directors, regulators, 
and politicians) regarding the effectiveness and sustainability of refundable check-offs programs 
have changed over time.  Now that refundable check-off programs are common, the uncertainty 
 
                                                 
53 Transcript 8. 
54 Transcript 17. 
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surrounding the effectiveness and sustainability of the refundable check-off model has reduced.  
The refundable check-off now dominates and is reputed as a check-off model that producers 
accept and that generates some money for research.  Established commissions have come to 
expect certain levels of funding and refunds.  The perception is that as long as actual 
performance of these check-off programs is consistent with expected performance, there is no 
reason to change it.  In other words, “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.”  Since check-offs are not 
perceived to be broken, no one attempts to fix them. 
5.6.3 Proposition 4: Summary and Conclusions 
This analysis suggests adaptive expectations contribute to check-off lock-in.  The 
interviews revealed that some Commissions have not considered or evaluated the prospects of 
switching to non-refundable check-offs to any real extent.  This decision was often based on the 
belief that switching is neither practical nor necessary.  Increased prevalence of refundable 
check-offs lead to a belief that support for a non-refundable does not exist or cannot be generated 
cost effectively.  Each of the last eight crop development agencies established was established as 
a commission and no commission has ever converted to a board.  Some consider this evidence 
that going the non-refundable route is not a practical option.  With this mindset, potential check-
off groups are more likely to choose the commission style and existing commissions are less 
likely to devote resources to exploring the idea of switching to a non-refundable. 
5.7 Summary and Conclusions 
This analysis, which examines the sources of check-off lock-in, suggests large set-up 
costs, coordination effects, and adaptive expectations contribute to check-off lock-in while 
learning effects do not.  The costs of setting up a refundable check-off program are large as a 
result of the difficult and complex procedures involved in establishing a commission.  Switching 
from commission to board involves a significant reinvestment of resources.  The economies of 
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scale that are a result of the high fixed costs of establishing a check-off, combined with the 
significant reinvestment that would be required to switch, mean that high set-up costs contribute 
to check-off lock-in. 
Coordination effects also appear to be an important source of check-off lock-in.  
Conformity among check-off programs is beneficial as it lowers the cost of establishing and 
operating a check-off program.  Now that most check-off are refundable, getting support for non-
refundable check-offs is more difficult. 
Adaptive expectations are a source of check-off lock-in.  Commissions have not, for the 
most part, examined the option of switching to non-refundable levies.  The increased prevalence 
of refundable check-offs has reduced the uncertainty regarding the effectiveness and 
sustainability of the refundable model.  It has also reinforced the belief that generating the 
support required to switch is not cost effective. 
Learning effects are not a significant source of check-off lock-in.  Improved performance 
of commissions, and the check-off system in general, can be attributed to learning at check-offs’ 
various institutional levels.  However, the similarities between commissions and boards with 
respect to the way they are organized and designed make these learning effects transferable and 
not a contributing factor to check-off lock-in. 
On their own, each of the three sources of check-off lock-in (large set-up costs, 
coordination effects, and adaptive expectations) bias the decision to either switch or stick with 
the status quo in favour of the latter.  However, these sources do not work alone.  They interact 
and complement one another and this interaction amplifies the costs of switching.  For example, 
large set-up costs not only make it more difficult and costly for a commission to switch, they also 
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make it more difficult to convince other commissions to switch as well.  This amplifies the 




CHAPTER 6: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
6.1 Introduction 
Crop development commissions in Saskatchewan seem to suffer from lock-in.  Low 
absolute levels of investment in research, together with empirical evidence from studies such as 
Gray and Scott (2003), Scott et al. (2005) and Gray et al. (2008), suggest producers spend too 
little on crop research.  Theoretical and anecdotal evidence suggests the refundable nature of 
check-offs is part of the reason for this underinvestment.  While switching to non-refundable 
levies is an option for these commissions, none have attempted to switch.  Failure to address the 
free-rider problem by transferring to non-refundable check-offs suggests commissions are locked 
in to administering refundable check-offs.  This thesis examined the sources of lock-in in the 
context of producer-controlled crop check-offs to determine if commissions are indeed locked in. 
The theoretical framework used to examine the sources of check-off lock-in was based on 
Douglass North’s theory of institutional change and Brian Arthur’s theory of technological lock-
in.  Four propositions, based on Arthur’s (1989) generic sources of technological lock-in but 
framed in the context of the research problem, were developed and tested.  Data for the analysis 
were collected through external review of publically available information and interviews with 
individuals directly involved in crop research check-offs. 
This thesis concludes in this chapter with a summary of the findings, policy implications, 
limitations of the study, and recommendations for further research. 
6.2 Summary of Findings 
The results of this study indicate that crop development commissions suffer from 
institutional lock-in that inhibits their ability to convert to development boards (a phenomenon 
referred to in this thesis as “check-off lock-in”).  This conclusion was supported by the validation 
of three of the four propositions that relate to Arthur’s sources of lock-in. 
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Large set-up costs associated with establishing a development commission support 
check-off lock-in.  Interviewees indicated that the process for establishing a check-off agency is 
complex, onerous, and time consuming.  Meeting the legal requirements set out by the Agri-
Food Act for establishing a commission, which includes proving to the Agri-Food Council that 
adequate producer support for the proposed check-off exists, is difficult.  If a commission were 
to attempt a switch from refundable to non-refundable, it would be required to go through a 
similar process all over again.  Interviewees suggested the cost and the effort associated with 
switching from refundable to non-refundable are major barriers to switching. 
Learning effects that occur throughout the establishment and operation of a refundable 
check-off system do not support check-off lock-in.  While learning effects are present, they are 
also transferable to a non-refundable system.  Therefore, learning effects do not seem to cause 
check-off lock-in. 
Coordination effects contribute to check-off lock-in.  Establishing a check-off requires a 
coordinated effort as many individuals, and groups of individuals, must work together.  As more 
individuals and groups of individuals go along with or support the idea of a check-off, the cost of 
coordination per unit decreases; however, switching to an alternative check-off system becomes 
more difficult. 
Evidence suggests adaptive expectations contribute to check-off lock-in.  The adaptive 
expectations theory predicts individuals alter their behaviour and actions in ways that make their 
expectations come true.  The expectations of those involved in the establishment and operation 
of check-off programs have likely been altered by their past experiences.  The broad adoption 
and continued use of refundable-style check-offs may have created a belief that non-refundable 
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check-offs are not a practical option.  As a result, decision makers are less likely to consider and 
support change. 
6.3 Policy Implications 
Since development commissions and development boards are so similar on the surface, 
the inability of commissions to switch to boards may seem unimportant from a policy 
perspective.  However, the importance of check-off lock-in becomes clear when one considers 
the magnitude of the producer underinvestment problem, and the anecdotal and theoretical 
evidence that suggests that non-refundable check-offs are able to generate more funding than 
refundable check-offs. 
Producers benefit significantly from their research investments, but continue to spend 
very little on research.  Studies such as Gray and Scott (2003), Scott et al. (2005), and Gray et al. 
(2008) suggest producers receive between $4.40 and $20.20 for every dollar they invest in crop 
research.  Despite these high rates of returns, producer check-off contributions typically amount 
to less than fifty cents per $100 revenue received from the sale of the commodity.  Since check-
off agencies typically spend less than one third of check-off revenue on research, producer 
research investment generally amounts to less than $0.16 per $100 revenue received from the 
sale of the commodity. 
Given the high rates of return and the low levels of investment it is not difficult to 




















Pulse 9,474,821 4,189,702 1.00 44 
Canola 2,965,617 941,200 0.21 32 
Flax 568,853 57,246 0.32 10 
Alfalfa Seed 124,809 58,272 0.78 47 
Mustard 329,059 41,525 0.50 13 
Forage Seed 48,688 5,642 0.75 12 
Canaryseed 264,895 75,516 0.41 29 
Oat 673,099 86,472 0.36 13 
Winter Cereals 191,753 7,000 0.32 4 
a Figures represent three-year average ending in 2009 fiscal year unless otherwise stated. 
b Check-off rates as a percentage of the value of the commodity.  For a description of the 
calculations, see Appendix A. 
c Research expenditures as a percentage of check-off revenue. 
Source: Author’s calculations.  See Appendix A. 
 
 
Converting refundable check-offs to non-refundable check-offs may be an important step 
to reducing the underinvestment problem.  While there are a number of reasons why producers 
tend to underinvest in research, as discussed in Chapter 3, theoretical and anecdotal evidence 
suggests producers’ ability to free-ride by requesting refunds is an important factor.  The 
theoretical argument is that commissions’ ability to increase check-off rates is limited because 
producers have the option to request a refund.  Commissions must consider producer refunds 
when choosing a check-off rate.  Boards, on the other hand, do not have this constraint when 
choosing a check-off rate and therefore may have more freedom to increase check-off rates and 
fund research at higher levels.  Anecdotal evidence from the Saskatchewan Pulse Growers and 
the Australian GRDC check-off system supports this argument.  Both administer compulsory 
levies and both collect funding and fund research at significantly higher levels than their 
refundable check-off equivalents. 
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As discussed in Chapter 3, lock-in may not be the only reason commissions have failed to 
switch to boards; however, this thesis suggests commissions are in fact locked in to 
administering refundable check-offs.  This begs the question, how might commissions escape 
this lock-in? 
According to Arthur (1988), escaping lock-in requires an exogenous shock or “injections 
of outside energy that ‘shake’ the system into new configurations so that it finds its way 
randomly into a lower cost one” (p. 16).  The exogenous shock Arthur is referring to, can come 
from a number of sources.  According to Cowan and Gunby (1996), a system can become 
unlocked by way of regulation, a crisis in existing technology, a technological breakthrough 
producing a (real or imagined) cost breakthrough, changes in taste, niche markets, or new 
scientific results. 
While this thesis reveals that Commissions are locked in, it does not reveal to what 
degree they are locked in.  In all likelihood, some are more locked in than others, which creates a 
dilemma for policy makers who now have two choices: do nothing and hope some sort of 
exogenous shock induces change, or intervene with policy in an attempt to induce change. 
Perhaps the most direct approach would be for government to simply decree that all 
check-offs be non-refundable.  The government could also make the process for switching 
simpler.  Currently, commissions can change their check-off rate by altering an agency order, 
which, assuming producers support the idea, is a relatively simple and straightforward process 
compared to what would be involved in switching to a non-refundable check-off.  Shapiro and 
Varian (1999) discuss the use of “sweeteners,” such as discounts on goods or services, to compel 
consumers to switch to a new brand.  Perhaps the government could subsidize switching from 
commission to board.  
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Commissions could adopt regulations that require them to review their operating 
procedures on a regular basis.  Perhaps votes could be held every few years on whether a given 
commission should continue charging refundable check-offs or switch to non-refundable check-
offs. 
Unless something is done to improve the performance of these check-off programs, 
farmers run the risk of losing their “voice” in the production and provision of crop research.  As 
discussed in Chapter 2, producer-controlled check-off programs give farmers a voice in both the 
production and provision of crop research, which is beneficial to both farmers and society as a 
whole.  If producer-controlled check-off agencies cannot find ways to fund research at 
significantly higher levels, the government may decide to take alternative action.  The 
government could, for example, decide to expand the scope of intellectual property rights to 
induce additional investment from the private sector.  Strengthening property rights can induce 
private research investment but it can it can also create other issues such as hold up problems 
(Gray et al. 2006). 
6.4 Limitations of the Study & Recommendations for Further Research 
The specific issue examined in this study is lock-in; however, the study relates to the 
broader issue of producer underinvestment in crop research.  As discussed in Chapter 2, there are 
many possible reasons why producers continually underinvest in crop research from a profit-
maximizing perspective.  These include information issues, lack of research infrastructure, high 
rates of return to other activities, public investment crowding out producer investment, and 
regional research spillovers, etc.  The refundable nature of check-offs, while potentially 
important, is only one possible source of the underinvestment problem.  Moreover, lock-in is 
only one theory regarding why commissions seem to prefer the status quo.  There are other 
theories, also discussed in Chapter 2, such as the endowment effect, cognitive dissonance, and 
81 
 
agency theory, which may help explain why commissions have not switched.  By focusing the 
analysis solely on the issue of lock-in, this study does not account for the other potential sources 
of producer underinvestment and status quo bias. 
Evidence gathered to examine the validity of Proposition 4 – adaptive expectations 
contribute to check-off lock-in – suggests agency theory could be applied to examine 
commissions’ apparent preference for the status quo.  Responses from interviewees revealed a 
certain comfort level with current and very modest funding and research expenditure patterns.  
This may be an example of the principal-agent problem, which suggests commissions might 
want to review their current incentive structures.  Further research could examine commissions’ 
status quo bias in the context of agency theory.   
Further research could account for irrational behaviour by examining the problem 
through the endowment effect or cognitive dissonance theory lenses.  In contrast to North’s and 
Arthur’s theories, which assume agents’ behaviour is economically rational, these theories 
assume agents’ biases for the status quo are irrationally based.  It would be very interesting to 
develop experiments and test the presence of these effects in the context of producer-controlled 
crop check-offs. 
While this particular study identifies the sources of check-off lock-in, it does not examine 
the degree to which commissions are locked in.  Further research could examine or attempt to 




Akerlof, G.A. and W.T. Dickens. 1982. The Economic Consequences of Cognitive Dissonance. 
American Economic Review. 72 (3): 307–319. 
 
Akino, M. and Y. Hayami. 1975. Efficiency and Equity in Public Research: Rice Breeding in 
Japan’s Economic Development. American Journal of Agricultural Economics. 57 (1): 1–
10 
 
Alston, J.M., M.A. Andersen, J.S. James, and P.G. Pardey. 2010. Persistence Pays: U.S. 
Agricultural Productivity Growth and the Benefits from Public R&D Spending. New 
York: Springer. 
 
Alston, J.M., C. Chan-Kang, M.C. Marra, P.G. Pardey, and T.J. Wyatt. 2000. A Meta-
Analysis of the Rates of Return to Agricultural R&D: Ex Pede Herculem. IFPRI Research 
Report No. 113, Washington D.C.: The International Food Policy Research Institute. 
 
Alston, J.M., J.W. Freebairn, and J.S. James. 2004. Levy-funded Research Choices by 
Producers and Society. Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics. 48 
(1): 33–-64. 
 
Alston, J.M., M.C. Marra, P.G. Pardey, and T.J. Wyatt. 1998. Research Returns Redux: A 
Meta-Analysis of the Returns to Agricultural R&D. International Food Policy Research 
Institute, Environment and Production Technology Division. Washington: IFPRI. 
 
Alston, J.M. and P.G. Pardey. 1999. The Economics of Agricultural R&D Policy. In Paying 
for Agricultural Productivity edited by J.M. Alston, P.G. Pardey, and V.H. Smith, pp. 6–
30. Washington, D.C.: The International Food Policy Research Institute. 
 
Arthur, W.B. 1988. Self-Reinforcing Mechanisms in Economics. In The Economy as an 
Evolving Complex edited by P.W. Anderson, K.J. Arrow, and D. Pines, pp. 9–31. 
Redwood City, California: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Inc. 
 
Arthur, W.B. 1989. Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-in by Historical 
Events. Economic Journal. 99 (394): 116–131. 
 
Campbell, Z., R. Jalili, and J. Vercammen. 2007. Producer-Funded R&D for Prairie 
Agriculture. CAIRN Policy Brief Number 8, Saskatoon, SK: Canadian Agricultural 
Innovation Research Network, September. 
 
Canadian Seed Trade Association website. 2008. Quick Facts.  
http://cdnseed.org/library/facts.asp (accessed January 5, 2009). 
 
Canaryseed Development Commission of Saskatchewan. 2006–2009. Annual reports. 
 
Coase, R.H. 1937. The Nature of the Firm. Economica. 4 (16): 386–405. 
83 
 
Coase, R.H. 1974. The Lighthouse in Economics. Journal of Law and Economics. 17 (2): 357–
376. 
 
Cook, M.L. 1995. The Future of U.S. Agricultural Cooperatives: A Neo-Institutional Approach. 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics. 77 (5): 1153–1159. 
 
Cowan, R. and P. Gunby. 1996. Sprayed to Death: Path Dependence, Lock-in and Pest Control 
Strategies. Economic Journal. 106 (436): 521–542. 
 
Evenson, R.E. 1989. Spillover Benefits of Agricultural Research: Evidence from U.S. 
Experience. American Journal of Agricultural Economics. 71 (2): 447–452. 
 
Farrell, J. and G. Saloner. 1985. Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation. RAND 
Journal of Economics. 16 (1): 70–83. 
 
Farrell, J. and G. Saloner. 1986. Installed Base and Compatibility: Innovation, Product 
Preannouncements, and Predation. American Economic Review. 76 (5): 940–955. 
 
Festinger, L. 1957. A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
 
Fullerton, D. 1991. Reconciling Recent Estimates of the Marginal Welfare Cost of Taxation. 
American Economic Review. 81 (1): 302–308. 
 
Fulton, M., H. Furtan, and R. Gray. 2007. The Provision of Goods and Farm Policy in 
Canada. Saskatoon, SK: University of Saskatchewan, Department of Agricultural 
Economics. 
 
Furubotn, E.G. and R. Richter. 1997. Institutions and Economic Theory: The Contribution of 
the New Institutional Economics. Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press. 
 
Government of Alberta website. Historical Turf and Forage Seed Prices in Alberta – to 2009. 
http://www1.agric.gov.ab.ca/$department/deptdocs.nsf/all/sis6720 (accessed November 
15, 2010). 
 
Government of Saskatchewan. 2004a. The Agri-Food Act, 2004. 
 
Government of Saskatchewan. 2004b. The Agri-Food Regulations, 2004. 
 
Government of Saskatchewan website a. Agriculture – Agri-Food Council.  
http://www.agriculture.gov.sk.ca/Agri-Food-Council (accessed August 12, 2009). 
 
Government of Saskatchewan website b. Agriculture – Statistics – Prices – Market Trends. 
http://www.agriculture.gov.sk.ca/Default.aspx?DN=99944486-a852-4501-93ad-




Gray, R.S. and S. Malla. 2000. The Effectiveness of Research Funding in the Wheat Industry. 
Saskatoon, SK: Agriculture Development Fund.  
 
Gray, R.S., S. Malla, and S. Ferguson. 2001. Agricultural Research Policy for Crop 
Improvement in Western Canada: Past Experiences and Future Directions. University of 
Saskatchewan, Centre for Studies in Agriculture Law and the Environment. Saskatoon: 
Saskatchewan Agriculture and Food. 
 
Gray, R.S., S. Malla, and P. Phillips. 2006. Product Innovation in the Canadian Canola Sector. 
Supply Chain Management: An International Journal. 11 (1): 65–74 
 
Gray, R.S., C. Nagy, V. Galushko, and S. Weseen. 2008. Returns to Pulse Crop Research and 
Development and the Management of Intellectual Property Rights. Saskatoon, SK: 
Saskatchewan Pulse Growers. 
 
Gray, R.S. and T. Scott. 2003. Returns on Producer Investments in Pulse Crop Research. 
University of Saskatchewan. Saskatoon: Saskatchewan Pulse Growers. 
 
Griliches, Z. 1958. Research Costs and Social Returns: Hybrid Corn and Related Innovations. 
Journal of Political Economy. 66 (5): 419–431. 
 
Grossman, S.J. and O.D. Hart. 1983. An Analysis of the Principle-Agent Problem. 
Econometrica. 51 (1): 7–46. 
 
Harris, M. and A. Lloyd. 1991. The Returns to Agricultural Research and the Underinvestment 
Hypothesis: A Survey. Australian Economic Review. 24 (3): 16–27. 
 
Klein, K.K., B. Freeze, and A.M. Walburger. 1996. Economic Returns to Yield-increasing 
Research on Wheat in Western Canada. Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics. 44 
(3): 207–218. 
 
Malla, S. 2000. Searching for Genes: Public and Private Spillovers in Agricultural Research. 
Ph.D. dissertation. Saskatoon, SK: University of Saskatchewan. 
 
Malla, S., and R. Gray. 2005. The Crowding Effects of Basic and Applied research: A 
Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of an Agricultural Biotech Industry. American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics. 87 (2): 423–438. 
 
Morris, M.L., H.J. Dubin, and T. Pokhrel. 1994. Returns to Wheat Breeding Research in 
Nepal. Agricultural Economics. 10 (3): 269–282. 
 
Nagy, J.G. and W.H. Furtan. 1978. Economic Costs and Returns from Crop Development 
Research: The Case of Rapeseed Breeding in Canada. Canadian Journal of Agricultural 




Nobel Prize website. Prize in Economic Sciences – All Prizes in Economics Sciences – 1993. 
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/ (accessed January 15, 
2010). 
 
North, D.C. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
North, D.C. 1992. Institutions and Economic Theory. The American Economist. 36 (1): 3–6. 
 
North, D.C. 1993. New Institutional Economics and Development. Working Paper. 
 
North, D.C. 1994. Institutional Change: A Framework of Analysis. Working Paper. 
 
OECD. 2010. OECD Factbook 2010: Economic, Environmental and Social Statistics. OECD 
Publishing. 
 
Pardey, P.G. and N.M Beintema. 2001. Slow Magic: Agricultural R&D a Century after 
Mendel. (Food Policy Report) Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy Research 
Institute (IFPRI). 
 
Peterson, W.L. 1967. Return to Poultry Research in the United States. Journal of Farm 
Economics. 49 (3): 656–669. 
 
Picciotto, R. 1995. Putting Institutional Economics to Work: From Participation to Governance. 
World Bank Discussion Paper No. 304. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 
 
Pierson, P. 2000. Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics. The American 
Political Science Review. 94 (2): 251–267 
 
Pulse Canada website. About Us. http://www.pulsecanada.com/about-us (accessed November 
30, 2009). 
 
Saskatchewan Alfalfa Seed Producers’ Development Commission. 2000–2009. Annual 
reports. 
 
Saskatchewan Canola Development Commission. 2000–2009. Annual reports. 
 
Saskatchewan Flax Development Commission. 2000–2009. Annual reports. 
 
Saskatchewan Forage Seed Development Commission. 2006–2009. Annual reports. 
 
Saskatchewan Mustard Development Commission. 2004–2009. Annual reports. 
 
Saskatchewan Mustard Development Commission website. Mustard Grower Website – About 





Saskatchewan Oat Development Commission. 2007–2009. Annual reports. 
 
Saskatchewan Pulse Development Board. 2000–2009. Annual reports. 
 
Saskatchewan Pulse Growers website. I am a Producer – Home. 
http://www.saskpulse.com/producer/ (accessed December 17, 2010). 
 
Saskatchewan Winter Cereals Development Commission. 2007–2009. Annual reports. 
 
SaskCanola website. About SaskCanola. http://www.saskcanola.com/about/index.html 
(accessed December 17, 2010). 
 
SaskFlax website. http://www.saskflax.com/ (accessed December 18, 2010). 
 
Schmitz, A. and D. Seckler. 1970. Mechanized Agriculture and Social Welfare: The Case of the 
Tomato Harvester. American Journal of Agricultural Economics. 52 (4): 569–577. 
 
Scobie, G.M. and R. Posada. 1978. The Impact of Technical Change on Income Distribution: 
The Case of Rice in Colombia. American Journal of Agricultural Economics. 60 (1): 85–
92. 
 
Scott T., A. Guzel, H. Furtan, and R. Gray. 2005. Returns to Research, Western Grains 
Research Foundation, Wheat and Barley Check-offs. Saskatoon, SK: University of 
Saskatchewan. 
 
Shapiro, C. and H.R. Varian. 1999. Information Rules: A Strategic Guide to the Network 
Economy. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press. 
 
Statistics Canada. 2006. 2006 Census of Agriculture, Farm data and farm operator data tables. 
http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/95-629-x/2007000/4123856-eng.htm (accessed July 5, 
2009). 
 
Statistics Canada. n.d. Table 326-0021 Consumer Price Index (CPI), 2009 Basket Content, 
Annual (table). CANSIM (database). Using CHASS (distributor). Version updated 
August 18, 2005. http://dc.chass.utoronto.ca.cyber.usask.ca/cgi-
bin/cansimts/getSeriesData.pl?s=v41693271&b=&e=&f=plain (accessed September 25, 
2009). 
 
Stigler, G.J. 1961. The Economics of Information. Journal of Political Economy. 69 (3): 213–
225. 
 
Thaler, R. 1980. Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice. Journal of Economic Behavior 
and Organization. 1 (1): 39–60. 
 




Ulrich, A.W. and W.H Furtan. 1985. An Investigation in the Rates of Return from the 
Canadian Crop Breeding Program. Ottawa, ON: Agriculture Canada, Program 
Evaluation Division. 
 
Ulrich, A.W., H. Furtan, and K. Downey. 1984. Biotechnology and Rapeseed Breeding: Some 
Economic Considerations. Ottawa, ON: Science Council of Canada. 
 
Widmer, L., G. Fox, and G.L. Brinkman. 1988. The Rate of Return to Agricultural Research 
in a Small Country: The Case of Beef Cattle Research in Canada. Canadian Journal of 
Agricultural Economics. 36 (1): 23–35. 
 
Williams, G.W. and O. Capps, Jr. 2006. Overview: Commodity Checkoff Programs. Choices: 
The Magazine of Food, Farm, and Resource Issues. 21 (1): 53–54. 
 
Williamson, O.E. 1985. Reflections of the New Institutional Economics. Journal of Institutional 
and Theoretical Economics. 141: 187–195. 
 
Zentner, R.P. 1982. An Economic Evaluation of Public Wheat Research Expenditures in 
Canada. Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation: University of Minnesota. 
 
Zentner, R.P. and W.L. Peterson. 1984. An Economic Evaluation of Public Wheat Research 





APPENDIX A: Data Tables 
Table A-1. Saskatchewan Crop Check-off Information 
Development Agency Date Established Registered Producers Check-off Status Fiscal Year 
Start End 
Saskatchewan Pulse Development 
Board July, 1984 18,000 Non-refundable September 1 August 31 
Saskatchewan Canola Development 
Commission February, 1991 26,000 Refundable August 1 July 31 
Saskatchewan Flax Development 
Commission April, 1996 15,000 Refundable August 1 July 31 
Saskatchewan Alfalfa Seed Producers’ 
Development Commission July, 1997      350 Refundable August 1 July 31 
Saskatchewan Mustard Development 
Commission October, 2003   2,300 Refundable August 1 July 31 
Saskatchewan Forage Seed 
Development Commission June, 2005 NA Refundable July 1 June 30 
Canaryseed Development Commission 
of Saskatchewan February, 2006   5,000 Refundable August 1 July 31 
Saskatchewan Oat Development 
Commission April, 2006   9,000 Refundable August 1 July 31 
Saskatchewan Winter Cereals 
Development Commission August 2, 2006   2,800 Refundable August 1 July 31 












Table A-2. Gross Check-off Revenuea (dollars) 
Commodity Fiscal Year Ending 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Pulse 2,408,818 2,748,418 2,478,225 3,075,810 4,369,329 5,184,037 4,852,436 6,578,792 9,773,330 12,072,342 
Canola 1,487,415 1,820,226 918,325 859,733 1,360,248 1,716,254 3,050,920 2,840,965 3,008,787 3,737,712 
Flax 579,178 498,875 502,202 448,962 540,661 376,137 633,235 725,407 557,827 505,103 
Alfalfa Seed 90,731 111,140 216,407 169,508 169,019 51,215 89,143 201,033 104,527 100,651 
Mustard     124,161 178,805 123,919 185,167 405,493 452,227 
Forage Seed       40,950 57,035 58,215 39,093 
Canaryseed         79,478 295,800 315,644 223,983 
Oat         576,377 835,514 704,256 
Winter Cereals        67,880 170,078 219,721 
a Check-off revenue before refunds. 
Source: Development Agencies’ annual reports 
Table A-3. Refunds (dollars) 
Commodity Fiscal Year Ending 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Canola 45,564 81,631 39,116 40,598 79,045 106,054 199,873 200,376 222,271 267,965 
Flax 27,643 21,937 26,415 20,465 29,833 23,839 27,512 30,080 31,540 20,158 
Alfalfa Seed 8,509 6,303 12,727 16,077 8,596 3,795 6,859 15,651 13,997 2,136 
Mustard     2,837 5,441 2,729 8,893 23,846 22,972 
Forage Seed       1,999 6,121 1,308 850 
Canaryseed       3,865 13,863 14,995 11,884 
Oat         21,312 32,422 43,116 
Winter Cereals        182 3,798 2,495 







Table A-4. Net Check-off Revenuea (dollars) 
Commodity Fiscal Year Ending 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Pulseb 2,408,818 2,748,418 2,478,225 3,075,810 4,369,329 5,184,037 4,852,436 6,578,792 9,773,330 12,072,342 
Canola 1,441,851 1,738,595 879,209 819,135 1,281,203 1,610,200 2,851,047 2,640,589 2,786,516 3,469,747 
Flax 551,535 476,938 475,787 428,497 510,828 352,298 605,723 695,327 526,287 484,945 
Alfalfa Seed 82,222 104,837 203,680 153,431 160,423 47,420 82,284 185,382 90,530 98,515 
Mustard     121,324 173,364 121,190 176,274 381,647 429,255 
Forage Seed       38,951 50,914 56,907 38,243 
Canaryseed       75,613 281,937 300,649 212,099 
Oat         555,065 803,092 661,140 
Winter Cereals        67,698 166,280 217,226 
a Check-off revenue after refunds. 
b Since the pulse check-off is non-refundable, the figures for pulse in this table are the same as they are in Table A-2. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Development Agencies’ annual reports 
Table A-5. Refund Ratesa (percentage) 
Commodity Fiscal Year Ending 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Canola 3.1 4.5 4.3 4.7 5.8 6.2 6.6 7.1 7.4 7.2 
Flax 4.8 4.4 5.3 4.6 5.5 6.3 4.3 4.1 5.7 4.0 
Alfalfa Seed 9.4 5.7 5.9 9.5 5.1 7.4 7.7 7.8 13.4 2.1 
Mustard     2.3 3.0 2.2 4.8 5.9 5.1 
Forage Seed       4.9 10.7 2.2 2.2 
Canaryseed       4.9 4.7 4.8 5.3 
Oat         3.7 3.9 6.1 
Winter Cereals        0.3 2.2 1.1 
a Dollars refunded as a percentage of gross check-off revenue.  Calculated by dividing values in Table A-3 by values in Table A-2. 





Table A-6. Research Expenditures (dollars) 
Commodity Fiscal Year Ending 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Pulse 1,394,499 1,259,636 1,015,682 1,572,497 2,252,010 3,113,474 3,373,358 3,306,210 4,021,320 5,241,575 
Canola 494,745 389,738 419,781 174,525 349,515 440,356 637,313 707,797 1,046,499 1,069,303 
Flax 267,594 271,747 195,625 183,619 100,725 589,07 37,774 91,677 25,389 54,673 
Alfalfa Seed 30,281 66,781 78,047 104,326 129,245 77,180 83,395 49,217 34,266 91,333 
Mustard      25,344 39,652 62,400 38,300 23,875 
Forage Seed       0 11,260 5,665 0 
Canaryseed        8,000 124,548 94,000 
Oat         25,000 79,737 154,678 
Winter Cereals        0 0 21,000 
Source: Development Agencies’ Annual Reports 
 
Table A-7. Commodity Prices Adjusted for Inflationa (2009 base year) 
Commodity Year 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Canola 275.20 335.12 409.57 377.11 361.15 270.34 273.40 379.10 501.41 399.39 
Flax 234.14 311.35 392.49 364.30 408.40 414.93 237.18 353.33 585.91 375.40 
Alfalfa Seedb 0.83 0.64 0.92 0.88 0.92 0.95 1.01 1.07 1.22 1.21 
Canaryseed 284.80 510.09 812.98 464.92 323.68 219.92 246.20 403.20 563.89 403.04 
Oat 84.77 132.06 210.21 137.67 120.25 112.76 130.53 165.08 166.37 114.72 
Winter Cereals 124.13 129.83 158.55 173.98 146.05 110.18 144.13 135.98 276.51 186.88 
a Price per tonne unless otherwise specified. 
b Price per pound. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Government of Saskatchewan website b, Government of Alberta website, Canadian 








Table A-8. Check-off Revenue, Research Expenditure, and Commodity Price, and Current Check-off Rate 
Commodity Net Check-off Revenuea Research Expenditureb Commodity Pricec Current Check-off Rate 
Pulse 9,474,821 4,189,702 - 1 % GVS 
Canola 2,965,617 941,200 358.18 0.75 $/tonne 
Flax 568,853 57,246 367.74 1.18 $/tonne 
Alfalfa Seed 124,809 58,272     0.96 0.0075 $/pound 
Mustard 329,059 41,525 - 0.5 % GVS 
Forage Seed 48,688 5,642 - 0.75 % GVS 
Canaryseed 264,895 75,516 423.27 1.75 $/tonne 
Oat 673,099 86,472 137.44 0.5 $/tonne 
Winter Cereals 191,753 7,000 158.62 0.5 $/tonne 
a Average annual check-off revenue from fiscal 2007 to fiscal 2009. 
b Average annual research expenditure from fiscal 2007 to fiscal 2009. 
c Ten year average real price.  Expressed as dollars per tonne for canola, flax, canaryseed, oats, and winter cereals.  Expressed as 
dollars per pound for alfalfa seed. 






















Agency Research Intensity2 
(percentage) 
Producer Research Intensity3 
(percentage) 
Pulse 1 44 0.44 
Canola 0.21 32 0.07 
Flax 0.32 10 0.03 
Alfalfa Seed 0.78 47 0.37 
Mustard 0.5 13 0.06 
Forage Seed 0.75 12 0.09 
Canaryseed 0.41 29 0.12 
Oat 0.36 13 0.05 
Winter Cereals 0.32 4 0.01 
a Check-off as a percentage of the value of the commodity.  Rates for check-offs based on production (i.e, canola, flax, alfalfa seed, 
canaryseed, oats and winter cereals) were calculated by dividing the current check rates in Table A-8 by the commodity prices in 
Table A-8. 
b Agencies’ research expenditure as a percentage of net check-off revenue.  Agency research intensities were calculated by dividing 
research expenditure values in Table A-8 by the net check-off revenue values in Table A-8. 
c Producers’ research expenditures as a percentage of the value of the commodity. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the sources noted in tables above
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APPENDIX B: Producers’ Check-off Preferences 
Background 
Evidence suggests producers collectively spend too little on crop research from a profit-
maximizing perspective.  Producers invest in crop research through check-offs.  One way to 
potentially increase producer investment in crop research is to alter existing check-off 
mechanisms.  Since producers would be included in a decision to alter check-offs, their 
preferences regarding specific check-off features are important. 
 
Purpose 
The purpose of this experiment is to examine whether information regarding the rates of return to 
research investment, research-funding levels in other countries, and alternative funding systems 
would affect producers’ check-off preferences. 
 
Methodology 
The subject of this analysis was a Farmer Marketing Club in rural Saskatchewan.  This relatively 
informed group agreed to participate in the experiment in return for a market outlook 
presentation from Professor Gray. 
 
The experiment was set-up as follows.  Participants were asked to fill out a survey.  After the 
survey was complete, Professor Gray gave a PowerPoint presentation that included information 
on the documented rates of return to investment agricultural research, research-funding levels in 
other countries, and alternative research funding systems.  After the presentation, participants 
were asked to fill out a second survey that was identical to the first to see if their answers 
changed. 
 
The paper survey used a multiple-choice format.  Participants were asked to indicate their check-
off preferences with respect to refundable versus non-refundable check-offs as well as check-off 
rates for various commodities.  Participants where asked to identify their preferred check-off rate 
for crops that they have grown recently.  The crops included in the survey were wheat, canola, 
pulses, barley, winter cereals, and canaryseed. 
 
For each crop, participants were to choose one of five rates for only the crops they have grown in 
the past five years.  The five choices included the current check-off rate charged to that particular 
commodity and four alternatives.  The current rate or ‘status quo’ choice was always option 3 
and it was revealed that it was in fact the actual check-off that they currently pay.  We provided 
this information to give the participants a frame of reference when making their decision.  The 
values of the alternative check-off rates were calculated based on the following formulas: 
 
value for option 1 = 0% (x)  where x = current check-off rate  
 
value for option 2 = 50% (x) 
 
value for option 3 = 100% (x) 
 




value for option 5 = 200% (x) 
 
All check-off values except for the pulse check-off values were presented in dollars per tonne.  
The pulse check-off values were presented as a percentage of the gross value of the sale which is 
consistent with the actual pulse check-off. 
 
Results 
In the first round of surveying, eight respondents indicated they preferred refundable check-offs 
and one respondent indicated a preference for non-refundable check-offs.  In the second round of 
surveying, five respondents indicated that they preferred refundable check-offs while four 
respondents indicated that they preferred non-refundable check-offs (see Figure B-1). 
 
 
Figure B-1: Preferences: Refundable versus Non-refundable 
 
 
In the first round of the survey there were: 
 
• eleven instances where participants indicated that they preferred a check-off rate equal to 
zero; 
 
• eleven instances where participants indicated that they preferred a check-off rate equal to 
half the current check-off rate; 
 
• eighteen instances were participants indicated that they preferred a check-off rate equal to 




• two instances where participants indicated that they preferred a check-off rate 50 per cent 
higher than the current check-off rate.  
 
On average, in the first round of the survey participants indicated that they preferred a check-off 
rated equal to 62 per cent of current rates.  
 
In the second round of the survey there were: 
 
• eight instances where participants indicated that they preferred a check-off rate equal to 
zero; 
 
• seven instances where participants indicated that they preferred a check-off rate equal to 
half the current check-off rate; 
 
• fifteen instances were participants indicated that they preferred a check-off rate equal to 
the current check-off rates; 
 
• eight instances where participants indicated that they preferred a check-off rate 50 per 
cent higher than the current check-off rate; and 
 
• four instances where participants indicated that they preferred a check-off rate 100 per 
cent higher than the current check-off rate. 
 
On average, in the second round of the survey participants indicated that they preferred a check-








APPENDIX C: Producers’ Check-off Preferences Questionnaire 
We would like to know – what is your ideal check-off?  Most crops grown in Saskatchewan have 
a development agency that collects a check-off on behalf of their growers.  The check-off money 
collected is used to fund various activities such as market development, extension services, and 
cost of production reducing research. 
 
Not all check-offs are the same.  Often, check-off rates vary between agencies with some 
charging relatively high rates and some charging relatively low rates.  Some agencies have their 
check-off revenue matched $1 to $1 by the government while others do not.  Some agencies 
charge a levy that can be refunded to the producer upon written request while others are non-
refundable.  We would like to know which features you prefer as well as your opinions on 
research check-offs in general. 
 
Section 1: 
Please put a check in the box that that best describes you and your operation. 
 
 
1) Are you a certified seed grower? 
 
 Yes    No 
 
 
2) Please indicate which of these age groups you fit in. 
 
 18-29  30-39  40-49  50-59  60-69  over 70 
 
 
3) What is the highest level of education you have obtained? 
 
 grade school    some high school 
 
 completed high school   post secondary training 
 
 university degree/diploma 
 
 
4) How many acres do you farm? 
 
 160-1280   1281-2560   2561-3840   3841-5120   
 
 5120 -10,000  10,000 + 
 
 
5) Will a family member continue to farm your land when you are no longer farming? 
 





1) Do you support crop research check-offs?   
 
 Yes     No 
 














2) Do you prefer a checkoff that is matched or unmatched by the government? 
 
 Matched    Unmatched 
 
 
3) Do you prefer a checkoff that is refundable or nonrefundable?  An example of a refundable 
checkoff is the WGRF checkoff on wheat and barley.  An example of nonrefundable checkoff is 
the Saskatchewan Pulse Growers checkoff. 
 
 Refundable    Nonrefundable 
 
 
4) Please check the level of check-off that you would prefer but only answer for crops that you 
have grown within the past five years. 
 
Wheat (including Durum)-measured in $/metric tonne 
 




 $0.30/tonne  (current Wheat checkoff) 
 





















































































APPENDIX D: Interview Consent Form 
 
Researcher:   Eric Froystad 
 
Phone:    306.966.4025 
 
 
Purpose and Procedure:  I would like to receive your responses to questions about your agency’s 
check-off mechanism.  The research will examine the factors that affect farmer investment in 
crop research.  Your participation in this study is appreciated and completely voluntary.  It is 
expected that the interview should last between 45 and 60 minutes, although some follow up may 
be required.  You may withdraw at any time without penalty during this process should you feel 
uncomfortable or at risk.  All interviews will be audio taped and you have the right to shut off the 
tape recorder at any time.  You should also feel free to decline to answer any particular 
question(s).  Should you choose to withdraw from the study, no data pertaining to your 
participation will be retained. 
 
Potential Risks:  The study team will make every effort to preserve the confidentiality of your 
comments (see below), but you should be aware that controversial remarks, in the unlikely event 
they are associated with you, could have negative consequences for your relationships within 
your industry.  We will try to ensure that your identity is protected in the ways described below. 
If for some reason the researchers wish to quote you in some way that might reveal your identity, 
they will seek your permission beforehand. 
 
Potential Benefits:  Participation will provide useful information that may improve agencies’ 
ability to generate addition funding for agricultural research.  Funding agricultural research has 
proved to be beneficial to farmers and society as a whole. 
 
Storage of Data:  Transcripts and original audio recording of the interview will be securely 
stored by the Supervisor (Dr. Gray) at the Department Bioresource Policy, Business and 
Economics for a period of five years.  The data will be destroyed, after at least 5 years, when it is 
no longer required. 
 
Confidentiality:  Mr. Eric Froystad will transcribe your interview at your request.  After your 
interview, and prior to any data being included in a final report, you will be given the 
opportunity to review the transcript of your interview, and to add, alter, or delete information 
from the transcripts as you see fit. 
 
The research conclusions will be published in a variety of formats, both print and electronic. 
These materials may be further used for purposes of conference presentations, or publication in 
academic journals, books, or popular press.  In these publications, the data will be reported in a 
manner that protects confidentiality and the anonymity of participants.  Participants will be 
identified without names being used, giving minimal information if this information is relevant.  
Pseudonyms or composite profiles may be used to disguise identity further, if necessary.  Any 
communication of these results that has clear potential to compromise your public anonymity 




Right to Withdraw:  You may withdraw from the study for any reason, at any time, without 
penalty of any sort. If you choose to withdraw from the study, any information that you have 
contributed will be deleted.  You will be informed of any major changes that occur in the 
circumstances of this study or in the purpose and design of the research that may have a bearing 
on your decision to remain as a participant. 
 
Questions:  If you have any questions concerning the study, please feel free to contact the 
Researchers at the number provided above. 
 
This study was approved on ethical grounds by the University of Saskatchewan Behavioural 
Sciences Research Ethics Board on May 27th/09.  Any questions regarding your rights as a 
participant may be addressed to that committee through the Office of Research Services (966-
2084). 
 
Consent to Participate:  I have read and understood the description provided above; I have been 
provided with an opportunity to ask questions and my questions have been answered 
satisfactorily.  I consent to participate in the study described above, understanding that I may 







__________________________     _________________ 





__________________________     _________________ 
(Signature of Researcher)          (Date) 
 
